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HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS UNDER SECTION 
10 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: THE 
ALABAMA BEACH MOUSE AND THE UNFULFILLED 
MANDATE OF SPECIES RECOVERY 
Jennifer Jester* 
Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs) developed under Section 10 
of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) have been heavily pro-
moted as a solution to the problem of balancing preservation of 
biodiversity with the rights of landowners. This Comment takes 
issue with the current policies employed by the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) in approving HCPs in order to grant 
incidental take permits to "take" endangered species in their na-
tive habitats. In the context of litigation over FWS's issuance of 
two recent permits to take the imperiled Alabama Beach Mouse, 
the Comment argues that FWS has construed narrowly the con-
servation mandate of the ESA so as to sanction use of a "survival 
standard," as opposed to a "recovery standard." Use of a recovery 
standard is the more reasonable interpretation of section 10, 
based on the purpose, text, and legislative history of the amend-
ment to the ESA. The Alabama Beach Mouse has paid the ulti-
mate price for FWS's reliance on the lesser standard. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Endangered Species Act's (ESA or the Act) ban on the "tak-
ing" of any endangered species has been a powerful tool for the 
protection of imperiled species. l Beginning in 1978 with the tiny snail 
darter in the seminal case of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 
* Editor in Chief, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1998-1999. I 
want to thank Dr. Martha Groom and her team of graduate students at the North Carolina State 
University Zoology Department for valuable assistance interpreting their important study of 
HCPs. 
1 See also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978). See generally 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1531-1544 (1994). 
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environmental plaintiffs have utilized the ESA's unambiguous direc-
tives to stop or delay development projects on federal and private 
lands inhabited by endangered or threatened species.2 Hill and its 
progeny, however, also created a perception that the ESA was draco-
nian legislation used by environmental zealots to topple important 
projects for the sake of obscure animal and plant species.3 
The impact associated with enforcement of ESA's prohibitions was 
moderated, however, by the introduction of permits enabling private 
landowners to "take" certain numbers of endangered species during 
the development or modification of property.4 Congress first amended 
section 7 of the ESA in 1978 to enable federal parties to obtain permits 
for incidental takings of endangered species after a mandatory con-
sultation with either the Secretary of the Interior, represented by the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), or the Secretary of Commerce, 
represented by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).6 Be-
fore granting the section 7 ''incidental take permit" (ITP), FWS or 
NMFS must find that the activity proposed by the federal agency is 
not likely to jeopardize the species' continued existence.6 A private 
landowner can obtain a section 7 ITP by demonstrating sufficient 
federal involvement in the project through federal authorization, per-
mitting, or funding.7 For example, a landowner could establish the 
required federal nexus by applying for a dredge and fill permit under 
section 404 of the Clean Water Act of 1977.8 The review of the appli-
cation by the Army Corps of Engineers would in turn enable the 
2 See Hill, 437 U.S. at 195; Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 
262 (9th Cir. 1984) (requiring the Department of the Interior "to halt and reverse the trend 
toward extinction, whatever the cost"); see also Federico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A 
New Way of Thinking About the Endangered Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1,2 (1996). 
3 See Hill, 437 U.S. at 193-94 (the Court found an ''irreconcilable conflict between operation 
of the Tellico Dam and the explicit provisions of §7 of the [ESA]" and granted an injunction 
against the dam's further development); see also ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY 673 (1st ed. 1992) (referring to the 
"tough potential effects" of the ESA's direct prohibitions). 
4 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539. 
5 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). FWS maintains responsibility under the ESA for land and 
freshwater species, while the NMFS maintains responsibility for marine species. 50 C.F.R. 
§§ 10.1,222.1 (1998); see also PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 656. 
6 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
7 See Christopher H. M. Carter, A Dual Track far Incidental Takings: Reexamining Sections 
7 and 10 of the Endangered Species Act, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 135, 163-64 (1991). 
8 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994); 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(b)(1)(ii) (1998); see also Donald L. Soderberg 
& Paul E. Larsen, Obtaining Incidental Take Permits Under the Endangered Species Act: The 
Section 7 Alternative, 20 REAL ESTATE L.J. 3, 5 (1991). 
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landowner to apply for an ITP to take endangered species under 
section 7 of the ESA.9 
In 1982, Congress once again amended the ESA to allow FWS to 
issue ITPs to private landowners who would unavoidably take some 
number of endangered or threatened species during an otherwise 
lawful development of their land.10 Congress predicated FWS issu-
ance of this form of ITP on the landowner's preparation of a conser-
vation plan-known as a "habitat conservation plan" (HCP).l1 The 
HCP and the section lO(a) permitting process provided Congress with 
the compromise it needed to placate private property owners and 
others who decried the Hill decision's "unequivocal deference to the 
literal interpretation of the [ESA]."12 Such a literal reading, it was 
argued, "cast[s] a long shadow over the operation of even the most 
important projects .... "13 
Despite the widespread negative reaction to the Hill decision from 
business interests and private landowners, the use of HCPs to obtain 
ITPs was a long time in coming.14 In the first ten years of the HCP 
program, FWS issued only fourteen ITPs.15 Commentators have sug-
gested several reasons for the slow growth in the number of appli-
cants for ITPs under section lO(a): (1) the lengthy delays associated 
with the application and negotiation process;16 (2) the lack of legal 
assurances that no additional money or restrictions on land use would 
be required of landowners should other endangered or threatened 
species be discovered inhabiting their propertyj17 and (3) the higher 
costs associated with section 10(a) ITP approval procedures as com-
pared with those of the section 7 ITP.18 
In response to these and other criticisms, FWS adopted revised 
HCP policies which streamlined the application process and provided 
9 See 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(b)(1)(ii). 
10 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). 
11 See id. § 1539(a)(1), (a)(2)(A). 
12 Soderberg & Larsen, supra note 8, at 4. 
13 Hill, 437 U.S. at 195 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
14 See Albert C. Lin, Participant's Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Sug-
gestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369, 372 (1996) (asserting that the 
number of HCPs developed up to 1996 was "puzzlingly low"). 
15 See HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS: THE QUIET REVOLUTION, Department of Interior, 
1997, at 5 [hereinafter QUIET REVOLUTION]. 
16 See Lin, supra note 14, at 372-73; see also Soderberg & Larsen, supra note 8, at 6; Robert 
D. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation Planning 
Under the Endangered Species Act of 1979, 21 ENVTL. L. 605, 607 (1991). 
17 See Thornton, supra note 16, at 607. 
18 See Carter, supra note 7, at 137. 
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landowners with a promise of "No Surprises."19 The No Surprises 
policy gives landowners who have acquired an ITP based on an ap-
proved RCP a legal assurance that they will not be subject to any 
additional responsibilities should new biological information on the 
endangered or threatened species emerge.20 While this policy has 
successfully increased private landowner use of the section 10(a) per-
mitting process,21 some environmentalists and conservation biologists 
have severely criticized it as "an end run around the ESA," and 
charged that FWS has capitulated to the interests of developers at 
the expense of critically imperiled species.22 
Other environmentalists have taken a more pragmatic approach, 
asserting that the RCP could become a powerful conservation tool if 
FWS modified the policies surrounding RCP review and ITP issu-
ance.23 These environmental commentators have proposed RCP policy 
changes that will promote species recovery,24 encourage active par-
ticipation of all interested parties in the ITP process,25 and ensure a 
foundation of adequate scientific knowledge and monitoring for 
RCPS.26 These commentators argue that FWS policies that reflect 
19 See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE AND NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK (1996) at 3-29 [here-
inafter HCP HANDBOOK]. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. at i. As of the end of August, 1996, 179 ITPs had been issued and approximately 200 
HCPs were being developed. See id. 
22 Jocelyn Kaiser, When a Habitat is Not a Home: Many Ecologists Say Conservation Plans 
Designed to Ease Tensions Between Landowners and Environmentalists are Not Grounded in 
Good Science, 276 SCIENCE 1636, 1636 (June 3,1997) (quoting Fraser Shilling, a zoologist at the 
University of California as stating that the HCP is "fatally flawed"); see John Kostyack, Reshap-
ing Habitat Conservation Plans for Species Recovery: An Introduction to a Series of Articles 
on Habitat Conservation Plans, 27 ENVTL. L. 755, 757 (1997) (citing Scott Sonner, More and 
More, AP PRESS POL. SERV., May 3, 1997, at *2, available in 1997 WL 2522322 (quoting 
environmentalist Melinda Pierce as saying "[e]ssentially, [HCPs are] a new way to get around 
enforcing the Endangered Species Act"». 
23 See Kostyack, supra note 22, at 757-58 (expressing the need to "improve rather than 
abandon HCPs"). 
24 See Cheever, supra note 2, at 5-7 (arguing that focus on section 4(0 of ESA, the recovery 
planning section, would provide the foundation for achieving the goals of the ESA); see also 
Victor M. Sher & Heather L. Weiner, Why HCPs Must Not Undermine Recovery, ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES UPDATE, University of Michigan School of Natural Resources and the Envi-
ronment, July-Aug. 1997 at 67, 67. 
25 See John Kostyack, Habitat Conservation Planning: Time to Give Conservationists and 
Other Concerned Citizens a Seat at the Table, ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, University of 
Michigan School of Natural Resources and the Environment, July-Aug. 1997 at 51, 53 (arguing 
that FWS "makes far-reaching decisions affecting the fate of species without providing mean-
ingful opportunity for input by conservationists, expert scientists, and other concerned citizens 
.... "). 
26 See M. Lynne Corn, HCPs: The Light of Yesterday?, ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, 
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these considerations would enable HCPs to fulfill ESA's original pro-
mise of species recovery.27 Recovery goals would be furthered by the 
mitigation, monitoring, and enforcement provisions explicitly in-
cluded in the HCP agreements themselves.28 Although now part of a 
popular FWS program, HCPs remain a controversial method of ad-
ministering the mandate of the ESA.29 
In August of 1998, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Alabama set aside two ITPs issued by FWS to allow 
the taking of an unknown number of individuals from the endangered 
Alabama Beach Mouse species (peromyscus polionotus ammobates) 
(ABM).30 The contested ITPs were for the development of two beach-
front condominium complexes in ABM habitat on the Fort Morgan 
Peninsula, along the Gulf Coast of Alabama.31 Sierra Club v. Babbitt 
was the first lawsuit to challenge FWS's grant of an ITP since 1985, 
when the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld 
an ITP issued to a California developer to take endangered Mission 
Blue Butterflies on the San Bruno Mountain.32 
Among other claims, the plaintiff in Sierra Club argued that FWS's 
issuance of the ITPs was based on insufficient biological information 
on the ABM,33 that the HCPs did not do enough to mitigate the 
University of Michigan School of Natural Resources and the Environment, July-Aug. 1997 at 
12, 12 (discussing the need for comprehensive scientific data on all RCPs in force so as to inform 
the process of future conservation planning). 
27 See Kostyack, supra note 22, at 757-58. Kostyack believes that proper monitoring of RCPs 
in force will fill in gaps in FWS enforcement of the section 9 prohibitions against takings, and 
that RCPs could encourage affirmative conservation measures essential for species recovery. 
See id. 
28 See id. 
29 See id.j see also Sher & Weiner, supra note 24, at 67 (arguing that RCPs fail to recover 
species and "interfere with efforts to prevent extinction"). 
30 See Sierra Club v. Babbitt, No. Civ. A. 97-0691-CB-C, 1998 WL 481452, at *1 (S.D. Ala.). 
This action actually commenced in April of 1997 in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia. The case was subsequently transferred to the Southern District of Ala-
bama in June of 1997. Oral arguments on cross motions for summary judgment were heard on 
May 21, 1998. See id. 
a! See Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Fort Morgan 
Civic Assoc. v. Babbitt, Civ. No. 97-00773 (D.D.C.) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Brief I]. This brief 
was written prior to venue transfer to the Southern District of Alabama, Civ. No. 97-0691-CB-C, 
and before the Fort Morgan Civic Association, Mickey Stephens, and the Biodiversity Legal 
Foundation withdrew their complaints, thus leaving Sierra Club as the remaining plaintiff. 
32 See Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 988--89 (9th Cir. 1985). 
B3 See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Federal Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Reply Motion in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or Pre-
liminary Injunction at 4-5, Fort Morgan Civic Assoc. v. Babbitt, Civ. No. 97-0691-CB-C (S.D. 
Ala.) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Brief II]. Plaintiffs Brief II was submitted by plaintiff Sierra Club 
after the case was transferred to the Southern District of Alabama, and it incorporates all the 
claims and arguments from Plaintiffs Brief I, supra note 31. 
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impacts of the development on the ABM,34 and that the ESA man-
dates a recovery standard that FWS ignored in its review of the 
HCPS.35 The Sierra Club further argued that given the above asser-
tions, granting ITPs to the developers in question was arbitrary and 
capricious, and not in accordance with statutory directives.36 
The arguments raised in Sierra Club reflect a growing consensus 
in the environmental community that FWS's current policies on HCPs 
virtually ensure that the plans will not recover the species they are 
designed to protect, and instead may bring them closer to extinction.37 
This Comment examines the ABM litigation in light of the current 
controversy over FWS reliance on HCPs to implement the mandates 
of the ESA. Section I traces development of the HCP as a conserva-
tion tool under the auspices of section 10(a) of the ESA. Section II 
provides background biological information on the ABM and its habi-
tat. Section III recounts major criticisms of current HCP policy, in 
particular FWS's lack of a conservation-based standard in its review 
of HCPs and the absence in many cases of critical biological data 
necessary to assess the veracity of HCPs. Section III also reviews 
two recent comprehensive biological studies of HCPs, one of which 
carefully examined one of the ABM HCPs at issue in Sierra Club. 
Section IV briefly recounts the challenge to the San Bruno Mountain 
ITP thirteen years ago, and compares it to the ABM litigation. Section 
V asserts that the two ITPs for the ABM should not have been issued 
based on the lack of scientific data available concerning the biology of 
the ABM and FWS's finding that the species could never be brought 
back from the brink of extinction without protection of its remaining 
habitat. Section V also argues that in order to fulfill the recovery 
mandate of the ESA, FWS policy will have to change from use of a 
"survival standard" in the review of HCPs to use of a conservation-
based "recovery standard." 
I. ADVENT OF THE HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN 
A. Why Preserve Endangered Species? 
In enacting the ESA, Congress recognized that endangered and 
threatened species are of "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, 
34 See id. at 18-21. 
35 See Plaintiff's Brief I, supra note 31, at 39--41. 
36 See Plaintiff's Brief II, supra note 33, at 2-3. 
37 See Sher & Weiner, supra note 24, at 67; Melinda E. Taylor, Promoting Recovery or Hedging 
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recreational and scientific value."3s In addition to the moral and ethical 
rationales advanced for the preservation of species, commentators 
have explained the importance of protecting species based on their 
social and economic utility.39 The first of these arguments focused on 
the prospective medicinal properties of endangered plant and animal 
species.40 Most species will not have such lifesaving characteristics, 
however, and this renders the argument that we should save species 
because they may potentially cure disease unpersuasive to those who 
require some measurable human benefit to justify endangered species 
protection.41 
One legal scholar has asserted that endangered species playa "so-
cial indicator" role that provides a potentially persuasive utilitarian 
rationale for the conservation of endangered species.42 This indicator 
role, the argument goes, warns us when destruction of habitat will 
impact not only the species who inhabit the region, but also the human 
values associated with health, safety, and effective resource manage-
ment.43 It does this by focusing legal attention on wasteful or unnec-
essary development projects in endangered species' habitat.44 
B. Mechanics o/the ESA 
To effectuate the nationwide policy to protect the aesthetic and 
ecological values of endangered species, the purposes of the ESA are: 
(1) to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endan-
gered species and threatened species depend may be conserved;" and 
(2) to "provide a program for the conservation of such endangered 
species and threatened species .... "45 In enacting the ESA, Congress 
declared that "all federal departments and agencies shall seek to 
conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize 
their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter."46 
a Bet Against Extinction: Austin, Texas' Risky Approach to Ensuring Endangered Species' 
Survival in the Thxas Hill Country, 24 ENVTL. L. 581, 593 (1994). 
38 16 U .S.C. § 1531(a)(3). 
39 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Embattled Social Utilities of the Endangered Species Act-
A Noah Presumption and Caution Against Putting Gasmasks on the Canaries in the 
Coalmine, 27 ENVTL. L. 845, 852-53 (1997); Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Legal Protection 
of Biological Diversity, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 269 (1991). 
40 See Plater, supra note 39, at 852-53; see also Doremus, supra note 39, at 269-71. 
41 See Plater, supra note 39, at 852-53. 
42 [d. at 853. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. 
45 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). 
46 [d. § 1531(c). 
138 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 26:131 
An endangered or threatened species is "listed" by FWS when the 
agency determines that the continued existence of the species is 
imperiled because of any "natural or manmade factors," including the 
destruction of its habitat.47 Section 4 of the ESA lays out the Act's 
conservation mandates, and requires that FWS develop a recovery 
plan that incorporates "site-specific management actions as may be 
necessary ... for the conservation and survival of the species."48 Each 
recovery plan should also have "objective, measurable criteria which, 
when met, would result in a determination . . . that the species be 
removed from the list."49 Based on the explicit text of the statute, 
recovery plans are intended to provide the blueprint for FWS's strat-
egy for "conserving" a species, or bringing it to "the point at which 
the measures provided by [the ESA] are no longer necessary."50 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, 
has held that FWS recovery plans are unenforceable and intended for 
"guidance purposes only."51 
When a species is listed as endangered, FWS is also directed to 
concurrently designate the species' "critical habitat."52 Critical habitat 
is defined as 
the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the 
species . . . on which are found those physical or biological fea-
tures (I) essential to the conservation of the species, and (II) 
which may require special management considerations or protec-
tion; and specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by 
the species ... upon a determination by the Secretary that such 
areas are essential for the conservation of the species.53 
Section 9 of the ESA includes a powerful prohibition against the 
''taking'' of any endangered or threatened species. 54 The statute de-
fines "take" to include "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, 
trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such con-
duct."55 Pursuant to authority granted by the statute, the Secretary 
of the Interior has promulgated regulations that define "harm" as any 
47 [d. § 1533(a)(I). 
48 [d. § 1533(t)(I)(B)(i). 
49 [d. § 1533(t)(I)(B)(ii). 
50 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3). 
61 Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 547 (11th Cir. 1996). 
62 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A). 
63 [d. § 1532(5)(A). 
64 See id. § 1538(a)(I)(B). 
65 [d. § 1532(19). 
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action that results in "significant habitat modification or degradation 
where [the action] actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly 
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding 
or sheltering."56 This interplay of statutory and regulatory provisions 
of the ESA has created its ''brute force" approach to conserving 
imperiled species on private property by enjoining development ac-
tivities that would destroy or modify habitat of an endangered spe-
cies.57 
C. Exceptions to the Section 9 Prohibition of "Takes" 
Congress mitigated the power of ESA's section 9 prohibitions with 
amendments in 1978 and 1982 to provide for FWS issuance of ITPs.58 
The 1978 amendment to section 7 required that federal agencies con-
sult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that all actions 
"authorized, funded, or carried out" by the federal agency are "not 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species 
or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modifica-
tion of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary 
. . . to be critical . . . ."59 This provision also requires all agencies, 
including FWS, to use the "best scientific and commercial data avail-
able" in making this determination.60 If the Secretary finds, after 
consultation with the federal agency, that the action will not jeopard-
ize the existence of the species or adversely modify its designated 
critical habitat, and that the taking of the species will be incidental to 
a lawful agency action, then the Secretary will authorize an incidental 
take of the species.61 The Secretary will also specify "reasonable and 
prudent measures . . . necessary or appropriate to minimize the im-
pact of the taking on the species."62 
Even if an agency action will jeopardize the continued existence of 
the species, a special high-level Endangered Species Committee can 
56 50 C.F.R. § 17.3; see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 
515 U.S. 687, 707--{)8 (1995) (upholding Secretary's inclusion of habitat destruction and modifica-
tion where it actually kills endangered species in the section 3 definition of ''harm''). 
57 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 673 (explaining that the prohibition under section 9 of 
habitat destruction reaches out beyond the federal government to encompass state and private 
actors). 
58 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(c)(2), 1539(a)(1)(B). 
59Id. § 1536(a)(2). 
6°Id. 
6! Id. § 1536(a)(2), (b)(4)(A)-(C). 
62 Id. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(ii). 
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approve the action.63 This so-called "God Committee" can approve the 
extinction of a species if it finds that: (1) "there are no reasonable and 
prudent alternatives to the agency action;" (2) "the benefits of the 
action clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of action 
consistent with conserving the species or its critical habitat, and such 
action is in the public interest;" (3) "the action is of regional or national 
significance;" and (4) "neither the Federal agency concerned nor the 
exemption applicant made any irreversible or irretrievable commit-
ment of resources .... "64 
Section 10(a) of the ESA provides that the Secretary may permit 
a taking that is "incidental to ... an otherwise lawful activity."65 To 
obtain such a permit, the applicant must prepare and submit an HCP 
specifying the following: 
i) the impact which will likely result from such taking; 
ii) what steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate 
such impacts, and the funding that will be available to implement 
such steps; 
iii) what alternative actions to such taking the applicant consid-
ered and the reasons why such alternatives are not being utilized; 
and 
iv) such other measures that the Secretary may require as being 
necessary or appropriate for purposes of the plan.66 
As delineated in section 10(a)(2)(B), the ITP shall be issued if the 
Secretary finds that: 
i) the taking will be incidental; 
ii) the applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize 
and mitigate the impacts of such a taking; 
iii) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the plan 
will be provided; 
iv) the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the 
survival and recovery of the species in the wild; and 
v) the [additional] measures [required by the Secretary], if any 
... will be met .... 67 
63 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e), (h). 
84 See id. § 1536(h)(I)(A)(i)--(iv)j see also PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 670 (1978 amend-
ments to ESA provided for the Cabinet-level committee dubbed the "God Committee"). 
65 16 U .S.C. § 1539(a)(I)(B). 
66 [d. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(i)--(iv). 
67 [d. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(i)-(v). 
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D. The Process of FWS Issuance of an Incidental Take Permit 
The landowner who wants to proceed with a project although it will 
take endangered or threatened species is required to obtain an ITP 
before initiating the activity.68 The ESA section lO(a) permitting proc-
ess consists of three phases: (1) the HCP "development phase;" (2) 
the "formal permit processing phase;" and (3) the "post-issuance 
phase."69 During the HCP development phase, FWS assists the appli-
cant in the preparation of the HCP, including formulation of the plan's 
minimization and mitigation measures.70 During the processing phase, 
the FWS Regional Office reviews the application and makes it avail-
able for public comment.71 FWS conducts an intra-agency consultation 
as required by section 7 of the ESA, and the HCP is reviewed to 
ensure satisfaction of the section 10(a)(2)(B) criteria.72 After issuing 
the ITP, FWS is responsible for monitoring the permittee's compli-
ance with the terms of the HCP and the permit, as well as the HCP's 
''long term progress and success."73 
In August of 1994, FWS implemented the controversial No Sur-
prises policy to provide regulatory assurances to permittees.74 Under 
this policy, FWS can require no additional landuse restrictions or 
financial compensation from the landowner in the event of any "un-
foreseen circumstances," which includes the discovery of new biologi-
cal information concerning endangered species.75 Conservationists 
have decried the No Surprises policy most vociferously, arguing that 
the long duration of the regulatory assurances makes them a long-
term subsidy for industry to develop endangered species habitats.76 
68 See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 1-4. 
69 [d. at 1-5. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. 
73 HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 1-6. 
74 See id. at 3-29; see also Donald C. Baur & Karen L. Donovan, The No Surprises Policy: 
Contracts 101 Meets the Endangered Species Act, 27 ENVTL. L. 767, 767 (1997). 
75 HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 3-29. 
76 See Sher & Weiner, supra note 24, at 69. A study of HCPs soon to be published by the 
National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis (NCEAS) and the American Institute of 
Biological Sciences (AIBS), tentatively titled Using Science in Habitat Conservation Plans, 
found that most new HCPs are in force for between 30 and 100 years, and the trend is toward 
increased duration. See Endangered Species and Wetlands Report, NCEAS Summary of Major 
Findings (visited Jan. 19, 1998) <http://www.eswr.com/nceas.htm> [hereinafter NCEAS PRE-
LIMINARY SUMMARY OF FINDINGS]. Environmentalists have argued that the No Surprises 
policy artificially shifts the risk of scientific uncertainty away from the marketplace, thus 
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E. ITP Issuance Must Comply with NEPA and with 
Section 7 o/the ESA 
1. NEPA Requirements 
FWS issuance of an ITP is a federal action that must comply with 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).77 In enacting NEPA, 
Congress recognized the "profound impact of [human] activity on the 
interrelations of all components of the natural environment," and it 
articulated the continuing policy of the federal government "to use all 
practicable means and measures ... to create and maintain conditions 
under which [humans] and nature can exist in productive harmony."78 
Section 102 of NEPA requires that an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) be prepared for all "major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment."79 The EIS must 
include, among other information, the environmental impact of the 
proposed action, any adverse environmental effects that cannot be 
avoided should the proposal be implemented, and possible alterna-
tives to the action.so 
To determine whether the issuance of a particular ITP constitutes 
a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment, thus requiring an EIS, regulations promulgated by the 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) require FWS to review 
both the context and intensity of the proposed action.81 This means 
FWS must review the significance of the action in the context of the 
"affected region, the affected interests, and the locality.''B2 FWS must 
also review the intensity of the impacts, including: (1) the degree to 
which "unique characteristics of the geographic area" are affected; (2) 
the degree to which the effects of the action are likely to be "highly 
controversial;" (3) the degree to which the possible effects of the 
action are "uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks;" (4) the 
degree to which the action "may adversely affect an endangered or 
threatened species" or its critical habitat; and (5) whether the action 
providing a public subsidy for the development of essential habitat. See Sher & Weiner, BUpra 
note 24, at 69. 
77 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994); Bee alBo HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 1-6. 
78 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a). 
79 [d. § 4332(2)(C). 
80 [d. § 4332(2)(C)(iHv). 
81 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1998). 
Wlld. 
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is "related to other actions with individually insignificant but cumula-
tively significant effects."83 
To determine whether the issuance of an ITP will require prepara-
tion of an EIS, FWS conducts an environmental assessment (EA) of 
the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts that would result from its 
approval of the ITP application.84 According to FWS policy, an EA 
prepared for a prospective ITP must include the anticipated environ-
mental impacts of the ITP, as well as alternatives to the development 
project specified in the ITP application.85 FWS "[n]ormally ... be-
lieves that analysis at the level of an EA will be sufficient for HCPs" 
when the mitigation measures in the HCPs reduce the environmental 
impacts of the ITP below the "significant" leve1.86 What constitutes a 
"significant" impact in the HCP context has not been explicitly 
defined by FWS.87 To issue a "finding of no significant impact" 
(FONSI) for a particular HCP, however, FWS must make "a clear 
finding that the HCP, considered together with mitigation measures 
that are part of the HCP ... will not result in significant environ-
mental impact."88 
2. ESA Section 7 Requirements 
FWS issuance of an ITP is a federal action subject to the require-
ments of section 7 of the ESA.89 Section 7(a)(2) requires that any 
issuance of an ITP must not "jeopardize the continued existence of 
any endangered species."90 "Jeopardize the continued existence of' is 
defined by FWS as "engag[ing] in an activity that reasonably would 
be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likeli-
hood of both the survival and recovery of the listed species in the 
wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that 
83 [d. 
84 See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 5-1. This assumes that the ITP is not "categorically 
excluded" from the EA requirement because it is defined by FWS as a ''low impact" ITP, 
meaning the expected individual and cumulative impacts on the species covered by the HCP 
are "minor or negligible." Low impact ITPs, as defined by FWS, do not require preparation of 
an EA. See id. at 5-2. 
85 See id. at 5-3. 
B6 [d. 
87 See National Environmental Policy Act Revised Implementing Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 
2375, 2382 (Dep't Interior 1997). 
88 See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 5-4. 
89 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536; see also HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 1-6. 
90 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
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species."91 This regulatory definition is identical to the section 10(a) 
requirement that the ITP not appreciably reduce the likelihood of 
survival and recovery of the species.92 Under the FWS regulations 
implementing section 7, FWS will issue a biological opinion (BO) as 
to whether the issuance of the ITP is likely to rise to the level of 
jeopardy.93 Section 7(a)(2) also explicitly requires that the RCP not 
destroy or adversely modify any critical habitat.94 If the incidental 
take permitted by an ITP would jeopardize the existence of the 
species or modify its critical habitat, the only recourse for the appli-
cant is to seek an exemption from the "God Committee."95 
3. Cumulative Effects Under NEPA and the ESA 
In its determination of whether or not to prepare an EIS prior to 
the issuance of an ITP, FWS must review the direct, indirect, and 
cumulative impacts of the proposed action.96 CEQ regulations define 
cumulative impact as "the impact on the environment which results 
from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, 
present and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what 
agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other 
actions."97 Cumulative impacts "can result from individually minor but 
collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time."98 
FWS regulations under section 7 of the ESA require the agency to 
address cumulative effects in its determination of whether issuance 
of an ITP is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the spe-
cies.99 The ESA defines "cumulative effects" as "those effects of future 
State or private activities, not involving Federal activities, that are 
reasonably certain to occur within the action area of the Federal 
action subject to consultation."l°O FWS does not include future federal 
actions, including future ITPs, in its cumulative effects analysis, be-
91 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
92 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv); see also Taylor, supra note 37, at 591. 
93 See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
94 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
95 See id. § 1536(h)(I). 
96 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b) (an environmental assessment must include a discussion of "envi-
ronmental impacts"); id. § 1508.8 (environmental impacts include direct and indirect effects of 
the proposed action); id. § 1508.27 (inquiry into whether action has "significant" effect must 
include cumulative impacts). 
97 [d. § 1508.7. 
98 [d. 
99 See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4). 
100 [d. § 402.02. 
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cause future ITPs will be subject to a section 7 intra-agency consult-
ation to determine whether they exceed the jeopardy threshold. lOl 
FWS has indicated that the starting point for review of the impact 
of an ITP is against an "environmental baseline" that "includes the 
past and present impacts of all Federal, State or private actions and 
other human activities in the action area."I02 In this way, FWS review 
of a new HCP should include the collective impacts of all previously 
authorized takes of an endangered or threatened species.103 
II. THE IMPERILED ALABAMA BEACH MOUSE 
The ABM, a tiny gray and white subspecies of the old field mouse, is 
found only in the sand dune ecosystem of the Fort Morgan Peninsulon 
the Gulf Coast of Alabama.104 In this habitat, ABM feeds on the fruits 
of sea oats and beach grasses and lives in burrows in the primary, 
secondary, and scrub dunes. lo5 "Primary dunes" are the sparsely-vege-
tated frontal dunes that parallel the shoreline, "scrub dunes" are 
farther inland and are more fully vegetated with saw palmetto, scrub 
oaks, and sand pine, and "secondary dunes" are the interdunal areas 
between the primary and scrub dunes. lOS 
The ABM, an important component of the sand dune ecosystem, 
helps protect the dunes from erosion by spreading seeds-mature sea 
oats and grasses then minimize the effects of wind and wave erosion 
on the dune habitat by anchoring the sand in place.107 The relationship 
between the ABM and the sea oats on the Peninsula is symbiotic, with 
the ABM relying on sea oats as its principal food source, and the 
propagation of sea oats aided by ABM's spreading of undigested seeds 
throughout the sand dune environment. lOB The protection of the dunes 
from erosion is also important to other species in the same ecosystem, 
including threatened green sea turtles and endangered loggerhead 
101 See Explanation and Justification for Endangered Species Act Regulations, 51 Fed. Reg. 
19,927, 19,923 (1986). 
102 See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02; see also Federal Defendants' Memorandum in Support of the Motion 
for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction/Sum-
mary Judgment, at 24-25, Fort Morgan Civic Assoc. v. Babbitt, Civ. No. 97-0691-MJ-C (S.D. 
Ala.) [hereinafter Defendants' Brief). 
103 See Defendants' Brief, supra note 102, at 25. 
104 See Final Listing Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 23,872, 23,872 (1985). 
105 See Alabama Beach Mouse Recovery Plan, u.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (1987) at 3 
[hereinafter ABM RECOVERY PLAN]. 
106 See Final Listing Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. at 23,872. 
107 See id. at 23,876. 
108 See id. 
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sea turtles, both of which nest at night on the beach area between the 
high water mark and the top of the primary dunes.109 As the beach 
erodes, there is obviously less sand dune area available for the turtles, 
and they are forced to look elsewhere for suitable nesting sites.uo 
By 1983, as a result of severe habitat loss due to residential and 
commercial development, recreational activity, and beach erosion 
from major storms, the ABM "survive[d] on disjunct tracts of the 
sand dune system ... but [it] apparently disappeared from most of its 
original range .... "111 In 1985, FWS thus listed the ABM as an en-
dangered species pursuant to section 4(a) of the ESA.u2 Importantly, 
at the time of its listing, there was no precise data on the number of 
ABM remaining,l13 although one biologist estimated the entire popu-
lation at less than 900 individuals.l14 From the time FWS began inves-
tigating the ABM habitat for the proposed listing rule in June of 1984 
until it promulgated the final rule in June of 1985, development along 
the Fort Morgan Peninsula shoreline subsumed an additional twenty-
three percent of the 13.9 remaining miles of suitable ABM habitat.u5 
As a result, FWS proportionally reduced the ABM's designated criti-
cal habitat in the listing rule to 10.6 miles of primary dune habitat 
stretching the length of the Fort Morgan Peninsula along the Gulf of 
Mexico in a thin band. 116 
The 1987 Recovery Plan for the ABM clearly articulated the tenu-
ous position of the ABM.117 Somewhat ominously, the plan indicated 
that given the extensive and permanent loss of habitat, it would 
"probably never be possible to safely remove [the ABM] entirely from 
the protection of the [ESA]."118 The "most essential task in the recov-
ery of the beach mouse," according to the Recovery Plan, was "the 
protection of existing beach mouse habitat."119 The Recovery Plan 
109 See Environmental Assessment on the Issuance of an Incidental Take Permit Under 
Section 10(a)(I)(B) of the Endangered Species Act to Fort Morgan Paradise Joint Venture for 
the Alabama Beach Mouse, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, at 15 (1996) [hereinafter Paradise 
Joint Venture EAJ. 
110 See id. 
111 [d. 
112 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a); see also Final Listing Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. at 23,872. 
113 See Final Listing Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. at 23,874. 
114 See ABM RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 105, at 6. 
115 See Final Listing Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. at 23,879. 
116 See id. at 23,880. 
117 See ABM RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 105, at 12. 
118 [d. 
119 See id. The ABM Recovery Plan also included plans for the Choctawhatchee Beach Mouse 
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divided the ABM critical habitat into three zones.120 The "recovery 
objectives" included in the plan were "to stabilize the present popu-
lations by preventing further habitat deterioration," and "to re-estab-
lish populations in areas from which they have been extirpated" so 
that the species would not be completely decimated in a catastrophic 
storm.121 The major conservation strategies included by FWS in the 
ABM Recovery Plan included: "(1) maintenance and/or restoration of 
suitable habitat ... ; (2) development of reestablishment programs; 
and (3) education of the general public."122 
The Recovery Plan stated that the ABM could be considered for 
de-listing when there were "three distinct, self-sustaining populations 
in each of the critical habitat areas, and a minimum of 50% of the 
critical habitat [was] protected and occupied by mice."123 By 1989, 
however, the ABM appeared to have been extirpated from one of the 
zones of its critical habitat, the suspected result of feral cat preda-
tion.124 
III. MAJOR CONCERNS WITH CURRENT HCP POLICY 
The Department of the Interior (DOl) has heralded HCPs as im-
portant conservation tools used to bring together "astonishingly di-
verse groups of people ... to resolve problems before they become 
conflicts, through cooperative, creative, and innovative partner-
ships."125 Some commentators have similarly found HCPs to be a 
"powerful tool for the preservation of biodiversity,"126 asserting that 
they provide an opportunity to "bring about conservation gains that 
could never be achieved by sole reliance upon the prohibitions of the 
[ESA] for non-federallands."127 However, some of these same com-
mentators and others find cause for grave concern in current FWS 
policies governing the development and implementation of HCPS.128 
and the Perdido Key Beach Mouse, given the almost identical habits, life histories, and threats 
shared by the three species. See id. 
120 See id. at 9, Figure 4. 
121 ABM RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 105, at 12. 
122 Id. 
123Id. 
124 Biological Opinion: Fort Morgan Paradise Joint Venture Request for an Incidental Take 
Permit for the Endangered Alabama Beach Mouse in Baldwin County, Alabama, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, at 3 (1996) [hereinafter Paradise Joint Venture BO]. 
125 See QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 15, at 2. 
126 See Lin, supra note 14, at 372. 
127 See Kostyack, supra note 22, at 757. 
128 See id. at 759-62. Mr. Kostyack is concerned with FWS RCP approval standards that do 
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The concerns of commentators and conservationists center on: (1) 
FWS reliance on a "survival standard" instead of on a recovery stand-
ard in its review of HCPS;129 and (2) the shaky biological foundations 
underlying many current HCPs, including a lack of basic data on the 
species, failure to incorporate adaptive management provisions to 
address unforeseen circumstances, and the limited role given to the 
scientific community and other concerned citizens in the permitting 
process.130 Each of these concerns is briefly discussed below. 
A. The "Survival Standard" 
Under section 10(a) of the ESA, FWS cannot issue an ITP unless 
"the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the species' 
survival and recovery in the wild."131 However, FWS does not require 
HCPs to contribute to recovery objectives specified in the species' 
recovery plan for the issuance of an ITP.132 To the contrary, FWS has 
concluded that "HCPs were designed by Congress to authorize inci-
dental take, not to be mandatory recovery tools.''133 The FWS position 
is based on the text of section 1O(a) requiring that a take "will not 
appreciably reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery,"134 but not 
explicitly requiring that the HCP provide a net benefit for the spe-
cies.135 FWS further regards the conservation measures in the recov-
ery plan as wholly distinct from the section 1O(a) ITP process.136 
not take into account the ESA's overall recovery goal, and with standards that are too lax with 
respect to unlisted species, among other concerns. See id. at 761-62. Other policy concerns 
surrounding FWS's implementation of the HCP program include whether HCPs actually miti-
gate impacts on endangered species habitat, and whether adequate enforcement mechanisms 
are being crafted in the agreements with landowners. See Daniel Hall, Using Habitat Conser-
vation Plans to Implement the Endangered Species Act in Pacific Coast Forests: Common 
Problems and Promising Precedents, 27 ENVTL. L. 803, 828 (1997). 
129 See Taylor, supra note 37, at 593; see also Cheever, supra note 2, at 72 (arguing that 
instituting recovery planning in the development of HCPs would provide an enforcement 
mechanism for recovery provisions not otherwise enforced under a species recovery plan). 
130 See LAURA HOOD, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, FRAYED SAFETY NETS: CONSERVATION 
PLANNING UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT viii-xi (1998) [hereinafter FRAYED 
SAFETY NETS]; Kostyack, supra note 25, at 51 (arguing for increased participation from con-
servationists and concerned citizens in the permitting process). See generally Kaiser, supra note 
22, at 1636-38. 
131 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (emphasis added). 
132 HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 3-20. 
133 Id. 
134 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (emphasis added). 
135 See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 3-21. 
136 Telephone interview with Sean Skaggs, Department of Interior Solicitor's Office (Nov. 7, 
1997). 
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The problem with this interpretation, according to conservationists, 
is that the purpose, policy, and conservation mandates of the ESA, as 
well as the legislative history of the amendment introducing section 
1O(a), all make clear that Congress did intend for HCPs to provide a 
benefit to the species.l37 The conservation mandate woven throughout 
the ESA, in particular the language of section 7(a)(1) requiring all 
federal agencies, including FWS, ''to utilize their authorities in fur-
therance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for 
the conservation of endangered species," has been interpreted by 
these conservationists to impose a duty to conserve threatened and 
endangered species on all FWS programs, including the agency's ITP 
policy.l38 FWS's failure to implement a recovery standard in the re-
view of HCPs not only contravenes the letter and spirit of the ESA, 
the argument continues, but also virtually ensures that imperiled 
species will never recover to the point of being de-listed.l39 
In the legislative hearings debating the addition of ESA section 10, 
Congress heralded the San Bruno Mountain HCP as the model for 
how private landowners, developers, and municipalities can plan to-
gether for habitats that preserve ecosystems while enabling develop-
ment to meet public needs.l40 One primary reason for the resounding 
Congressional approval of the San Bruno Mountain HCP was the 
finding that it actually enhanced the situation of the critically endan-
gered butterfly species.l4l Although the scientific truth of this claim 
became the subject of litigation, Congress "viewed the [San Bruno 
HCP] as the paradigm approach to compliance with section 1O(a).''142 
Indeed, the House Conference Report indicated that the San Bruno 
plan was "the model for the incidental take permit" and the "adequacy 
of other plans should be measured against the San Bruno plan."l43 
137 See 16 U.S.C. § 1531; H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at 30-32 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2807, 2871-72; see also Taylor, supra note 37, at 593-94 (asserting that FWS reliance on the 
survival standard contravenes the purpose of the ESA); Cheever, supra note 2, at 5 (arguing 
that emphasizing the ESA's concept of recovery is key to making the Act more effective in 
achieving its goal of the preservation of species); Sher & Weiner, supra note 24, at 67 (noting 
that recovery of species is the "guiding light" of the ESA). 
138 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(I); see Taylor, supra note 37, at 594. 
139 See Kostyack, supra note 22, at 761-62; Sher & Weiner, supra note 24, at 69 (arguing that 
until HCPs are re-oriented toward the recovery goals of the ESA, they "will do more to preclude 
recovery than to ensure it"). 
140 H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at 31-32 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2871-72. 
141 See Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d at 983-84. 
142 Id. at 982. 
143 H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at 31-32 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2871-72. 
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Given this, it is clear that Congress intended that review of RCPs 
should include an analysis of the extent to which the RCP would 
enhance and conserve the species affected by the applicant's activ-
ity.144 
B. Inadequate Biological Foundation/or Heps 
1. Dearth of Data 
Conservationists and biologists have widely criticized RCPs for 
their questionable scientific foundation.145 They cite such major prob-
lems as insufficient designation of protected habitat for species recov-
ery, and the "fragmented assemblage" of protected habitat created by 
numerous small RCPS.146 The resulting haphazard configuration of 
habitat leaves no clear way for individuals from the species to migrate 
between the protected areas, according to these critics.147 The scien-
tific community has also questioned FWS's current reliance on RCPs 
as the primary mechanism with which to address the interests of both 
species and landowners, even when no concrete data exists on the real 
impact of RCPs on the species they purport to protect.148 
In the first comprehensive efforts to analyze the effectiveness of 
conservation planning under section 10(a), two in-depth studies of 
RCPs have recently been conducted. In the first, the National Center 
for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis (NCEAS)149 conducted a scien-
tific survey of 206 RCPs to uncover any "clear trends in their attrib-
144 See id. 
145 See Dennis Murphy et al., A Statement on Proposed Private Lands Initiatives and 
Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act from the Meeting of Scientists at Stanford 
University, THE SCIENCE OF CONSERVATION PLANNING 214-19 (Island Press 1997) (reprinted 
in DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, FRAYED SAFETY NETS: CONSERVATION PLANNING UNDER THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 91-96 (1998)) [hereinafter Stanford Letter]; see also Kaiser, supra 
note 22, at 1636. 
146 Kaiser, supra note 22, at 1637. 
147 See id. 
148 See Corn, supra note 26, at 12 (citing a "paucity of data on the current actions and their 
effects"); see also FRAYED SAFETY NETS, supra note 130, at ix ("Adequate biological monitor-
ing, essential to determine whether the plans are working as intended, is commonly lacking."). 
149 See NCEAS Home Page, Mission and Funding Statement (visited Feb. 3, 1998) 
<http://nceas.ucsb.edu/nceas-web/center/>. The NCEAS is an organization of scientists that 
synthesizes existing data on ecology, making it available to other researchers. NCEAS is funded 
by the National Science Foundation, the State of California and the University of California at 
Santa Barbara. See id. 
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utes."I50 The research, sponsored jointly by the American Institute of 
Biological Sciences (AIBS), 
synthesize[d] available information on existing HCPs, conduct[ed] 
a detailed analysis of a representative set of HCPs to evaluate 
their likely effectiveness as a tool for conserving endangered spe-
cies and habitats, and identif[ied] ecological theory and methods 
that can be applied to strengthen the design, management and 
monitoring of HCP areas.l5l 
The NCEAS analysis focused primarily on an evaluation of the 
"scientific rigor" of the various plans' biological assessments and miti-
gation strategies.l52 The preliminary findings of an in-depth study of 
forty-three of the 206 HCPs suggest that the lack of basic biological 
information for the evaluation of species status, take, and project 
impact is a "serious impediment to the scientifically-based develop-
ment of HCPS."153 The analysis further revealed that the design of 
mitigation and monitoring strategies in HCPs is often inadequate, due 
either to a lack of species data or to a misapplication of available 
data.154 Also, NCEAS determined that there is substantial variation 
in the overall adequacy of data analysis underlying HCP develop-
ment.1SS The mitigation measures of many HCPs are generally un-
tested, and "more research and broad dissemination of research is 
clearly necessary .... "156 
In the second study, the Defenders of Wildlife "assessed the scien-
tific content, funding, public participation, and legal implementation 
of 24 [conservation] plans, mostly HCPs, across the country."157 De-
fenders of Wildlife found that most of the plans reviewed did not con-
tribute to the recovery of endangered species, in part because of 
"scientific shortcomings" and inadequate biological monitoring of 
HCPs in force. 1s8 
150 NCEAS PRELIMINARY SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, supra note 76. As indicated in note 76, 
the forthcoming NCEAS/AIBS study is tentatively titled Using Science in Habitat Conserva-
tion Plans. 
151 See Habitat Conservation Planning for Endangered Species (visited Feb. 13, 1998) 
<http://nceas.uceas.ucsb.edulnceasweb/projectsl97KAREI2I>. 
152 NCEAS PRELIMINARY SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, supra note 76. 
153 [d. 
164 See id. 
155 See id. 
156 [d. 
157 FRAYED SAFETY NETS, supra note 130, at xi. 
158 [d. at viii-ix. 
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2. Failure to Incorporate Adaptive Management Provisions in 
RCPs 
FWS reliance on the controversial No Surprises policy to lock in 
RCPs with limited provisions for adaptive management throughout 
the life of the ITP has also generated alarm among the scientific and 
environmental communities.159 "Adaptive management" is the ability 
of FWS and the permittee to adjust the mitigation strategies specified 
in an RCP in the event of unforeseen circumstances or discovery of 
new information on protected species. l60 Opponents of the No Sur-
prises policy and concerned scientists argue that RCPs must be flex-
ible enough to plan for additional or different mitigation as the current 
limited biological understanding of many imperiled species and eco-
systems is supplemented by additional research.161 Proponents of the 
policy argue that a landowner will only voluntarily agree to restric-
tions on the use of his or her land if the restrictions are accompanied 
by a ''bankable understanding that more land or more money will not 
be required at the whim or caprice of the regulatory agency .... "162 
Based on its study of RCPs, the NCEAS believes that adaptive 
management provisions take on critical importance in cases where 
basic biological data on the affected species is missing.l63 Defenders of 
Wildlife agrees that RCPs must be equipped with "a method to 
change management techniques according to changing conditions."164 
Scientists and conservationists argue that FWS should provide a 
mechanism to incorporate new biological knowledge into RCPS.165 
169 See Hall, supra note 128, at 828 (arguing that the No Surprises Policy severely limits 
FWS's ability to request additional or improved mitigation measures from landowners); see also 
Kostyack, supra note 22, at 763. 
160 See generally Kostyack, supra note 22, at 763. 
161 See FRAYED SAFETY NETS, supra note 130, at 26 ("Any science-based conservation plan 
must incorporate techniques of adaptive management, whereby experimental approaches to 
management are monitored and changed with information generated by those experiments."); 
Corn, supra note 26, at 14; Hall, supra note 128, at 828; Sher & Weiner, supra note 24, at 69. 
162 Robert D. Thornton, The No Surprises Policy is Essential to Attract Private Dollars for 
the Protection of Biodiversity, ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, University of Michigan School 
of Natural Resources and the Environment, July-Aug. 1997, at 65, 66. 
163 See NCEAS PRELIMINARY SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, supra note 76. 
164 FRAYED SAFETY NETS, supra note 130, at 26. 
165 See id.; see also NCEAS PRELIMINARY SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, supra note 76; Eric 
Fisher, Comment, Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: No 
Surprises and the Questfor Certainty, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 371, 398 (1996) (arguing that the 
No Surprises policy renders shortcomings in scientific data even more critical, due to the 
likelihood that HCPs currently in force will be shown to be inadequate to preserve species once 
new information is discovered); Kostyack, supra note 22, at 763 (arguing that the No Surprises 
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Once a mistaken or incomplete assumption concerning a species' bio-
logical status is locked into a legal assurance for the landowner, any 
changed circumstance not addressed by timely corrective action can 
further thwart the species' chance of recovery.166 The ability to exer-
cise adaptive management is a "critical tool for refining mitigation 
strategies to minimize the risks of detrimental impacts on threatened 
and endangered species."167 
3. Scientific Community and Concerned Citizens Need Increased 
Role in the Permitting Process 
Commentators have also criticized FWS's practice of negotiating 
the HCP agreements with applicants ''behind the scenes," only to 
release them for public comment once the HCP design is complete.16s 
Negotiation of this type basically forecloses any opportunity for the 
scientific community, conservationists, and concerned citizens to par-
ticipate in the process of designing HCPs that benefit the endangered 
species as well as the landowner.169 This is because once the applicant 
and FWS have invested so much money and time into the negotiation 
and development of the HCP, they are unlikely to alter their course.170 
It also renders the public comment period on HCPs a formality with 
which FWS must comply but one that rarely affects the outcome of 
ITP issuance. l7l 
Commentators have increasingly viewed the involvement of the 
scientific community as an integral part of the process to ensure that 
HCPs are ''broadly supported and based on the best available scien-
tific information."172 The current FWS policy of including in negotia-
policy fails to ensure that HCPs can be adjusted to take into consideration new information and 
changed circumstances). 
166 See generally Sher & Weiner, supra note 24, at 69. 
167 NCEAS PRELIMINARY SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, supra note 76. 
168 Kostyack, supra note 22, at 763; see also Fernando Molini, The Emerging of Habitat 
Conservation Planning and Its Impact on Wildlife Conservation, 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 151, 169 
(1996) (articulating the importance of scientists' participation to ensure ''biological integrity" of 
HCPs, as well as representation of environmental interests to ''reduce political pressures"). 
169 See id. 
170 See FRAYED SAFETY NETS, supra note 130, at 41. 
171 See Kostyack, supra note 25, at 52. One approach relied on by FWS is expenditure of 
minimal efforts to elicit public participation, including use of the bare minimum 30-day notice 
in the Federal Register. By the time the public is aware that the HCP is being developed, its 
terms have already been solidified. At this point, it is highly unlikely that public input will result 
in any modifications to the HCP. See id. 
I'll! See id. at 53. 
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tions only parties directly interested in permit acquisition excludes 
"individuals with biological experience [who] can ensure the biological 
integrity of HCPS,"173 and undermines the ability of FWS to make 
sound decisions based on science.174 
In 1997, a team of leading biologists assembled at Stanford Univer-
sity to study approved HCPs, and found that many were "developed 
without adequate scientific guidance."176 In a letter to Congressional 
leaders and the Clinton Administration, the assembled scientists ob-
served that "HCPs have the potential to become habitat giveaways 
that contribute to, rather than alleviate, threats to listed species and 
their habitats."176 One commentator has proposed that the Clinton 
Administration "develop rules that ensure that independent experts 
and affected interests have a seat at the negotiation table from the 
onset of HCP negotiations."177 
C. Scientific Review of Alabama Beach Mouse HCPs 
As part of the NCEAS comprehensive study of HCPs, a faculty 
member and team of graduate students at North Carolina State Uni-
versity reviewed four of the HCPs submitted to obtain permits to 
take the ABM.178 The research team first gathered and synthesized 
all the published and much of the unpublished biological data available 
on the ABM.179 The team then reviewed the four HCPs to determine 
whether all the known information on the species was incorporated 
into the mitigation and minimization measures of the plans. ISO The 
team then evaluated each individual HCP based on a specific set of 
173 Molini, supra note 168, at 169. 
174 See Kostyack, supra note 25, at 53. 
176 Stanford Letter, supra note 145, at 91. 
176 Id. 
177 See Kostyack, supra note 25, at 51. 
178 See Memorandum from Dr. Martha Groom, Department of Zoology to Jennifer Jester, 
North Carolina State University (Sept. 1, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum 
from Dr. Martha Groom]. Dr. Groom acted as Faculty Leader of the NCEAS ABM Research 
Team at North Carolina State University. Dr. Groom and members of her research team 
graciously agreed to be interviewed and provided information concerning the results to be 
published in the forthcoming NCEASJAIBS study of HCPs, Using Science in Habitat Conser-
vation Plans. The ABM HCPs for multi-unit housing developments examined by the NCEAS 
project include those for Fort Morgan Paradise Venture, Sage Development, and D&E Invest-
ments. The fourth HCP surveyed by NCEAS covers a single family home on 1.21 acres. This 
HCP is not the subject of analysis herein, given its vastly smaller size than those HCPs that 
are currently the subject of litigation. See id. 
179 See id. 
1111 See id. 
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factors grouped into six categories: (1) severity of various threats to 
the ABM on land covered by the HCP in question; (2) information 
that went into the HCP's assessment of ABM's current status; (3) 
information on the amount oftaking that will occur; (4) conclusions on 
the impacts of the takings; (5) assessment of minimization and miti-
gation measures; and (6) analysis of monitoring programs.181 
The team of biologists scored each factor on a scale of one to six, 
with one being excellent and six being extremely poor, and then 
provided an overall score of the HCP for each category.l82 The most 
severe threats to the ABM's continued existence were judged to be 
habitat loss and degradation.l83 For all the HCPs, the team noted that 
there was little data available to allow an accurate assessment of the 
size or density of ABM populations inside and surrounding the HCP 
areas.l84 
Based on the absence of basic population data, the NCEAS team 
was unable to draw conclusions concerning the current status of the 
ABM, and for all the ABM RCPs analyzed, NCEAS scored the overall 
adequacy of the plans' assessments of ABM status as either "sig-
nificantly lacking in data or analysis to reach conclusions" or as "in-
adequate."l85 In order to estimate take for an ITP, it is necessary to 
have a reasonably accurate estimate of either the size of the popula-
tion, both inside and outside the permit area, or an estimate of popu-
lation densities in the habitat affected by the proposed development 
as compared to regions outside the permit area.186 From these quan-
tities, it is possible to estimate what proportion of the popUlation as 
a whole will be taken during the planned activities.187 Although some 
surveys of ABM have been conducted, their design was not adequate 
to enable estimation of population density or local or regional popUla-
tion size.l88 
181 Telephone Interview with Susan Shriner, North Carolina State University (Feb. 13, 1998) 
(notes on file with author) [hereinafter Shriner Feb. Interview]. Ms. Shriner was a member of 
the research team at NCSU that studied the ABM HCPs as part of the forthcoming 
NCEAS/AIBS study, Using Science in Habitat Conservation Plans. 
182 See id. 
183 See Memorandum from Dr. Martha Groom, supra note 178. For Fort Morgan Paradise Joint 
Venture's 86.3 acres of high density condominium development, Sage Development's 35.26 acres 
of high density housing, D&E Investment's low density development of 252 acres, habitat loss 
was ranked as the most serious threat. See id. 
184 See id. 
186 See id. 
186 See id. 
187 See Memorandum from Dr. Martha Groom, supra note 178. 
188 See id. 
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All the ABM HCPs reviewed by the NCEAS team used the num-
ber of acres of ABM habitat to be destroyed or modified by develop-
ment to estimate the take that would occur.189 This methodology is 
sufficient only if accurate estimates of population density within these 
habitats are known.19o However, given the uncertainties in measuring 
the abundance of the ABM, the NCEAS team found it "troublingly 
unclear how large a fraction of the species could be affected in each 
case."191 The team found that although the ABM HCPs included indi-
rect estimates of each take (based on habitat destroyed), they pro-
vided no indication of the impact of these takes on the species.192 This 
appeared to the NCEAS team to result from a failure to consider the 
cumulative impacts of the other approved ITPs in the decisions re-
garding the effects of each new proposal.I93 
The NCEAS team reviewed one of the ABM HCPs challenged by 
the Sierra Club in U.S. District Court. 194 The mitigation measures 
employed in the Fort Morgan Paradise Joint Venture (Paradise Joint 
Venture) HCP were rated by NCEAS as "extremely poor."195 Accord-
ing to the NCEAS review, this HCP included only actions to minimize 
the impacts of the development, without clear demonstration that 
these actions would in fact ameliorate the negative effects on the 
ABM.196 Additionally, the Paradise Joint Venture high-density condo-
minium development borders Zone 2 of the designated critical habitat 
for the ABM, generally regarded by the scientific community as the 
highest quality ABM habitat.197 
The other ITP applicant involved in the Sierra Club case, Aronov 
Realty and Management, Inc. (Aronov), was not part of the in-depth 
review of HCPs conducted by the NCEAS. Section V more spe-
cifically addresses the minimization and mitigation measures of the 
HCPs challenged in federal court. 
189 See Shriner Feb. Interview, supra note 181. 
190 See Memorandum from Dr. Martha Groom, supra note 178. 
191Id. 
192 See id. 
193 See id. 
194 See Shriner Feb. Interview, supra note 181; see also Sierra Club, 1998 WL 481452, at *5 
(describing the Fort Morgan Paradise Joint Venture project). 
195 Memorandum from Dr. Martha Groom, supra note 178. 
196 See id. 
197 See Shriner Feb. Interview, supra note 181. When the ABM was listed as endangered in 
1985, FWS designated ABM critical habitat in three zones totaling 0.6 miles along the coast of 
the Fort Morgan Peninsula. See ABM RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 105, at 9, Figure 4. 
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The NCEAS review of monitoring techniques in the HCPs focused 
on two questions: (1) was there sufficient monitoring to determine 
actual population status and take levels; and (2) was there a monitor-
ing strategy to determine whether the HCP minimization and miti-
gation techniques were actually working?198 The ABM HCPs' moni-
toring of status, take, and mitigation measures was limited to 
trapping for presence/absence of ABM and house mice (thought to be 
a competitor to the ABM).199 This technique is rather uninformative, 
according to researchers, because it provides little or no data on 
trends in population size, information critical for assessing the health 
of the population.2°O In the case of the ABM, it is extremely difficult 
to collect accurate data on even such simple information as population 
size, yet these data, as well as those concerning movements of the 
species and survival or reproductive rates, are needed to make a fully 
informed judgment concerning the status of the species in the face of 
development.201 Without vigorous monitoring, it is impossible to as-
sess the current or cumulative impacts of that development, or of 
naturally occurring events, such as hurricanes.202 
In short, the NCEAS team concluded that the ABM HCPs did not 
provide for monitoring that could allow confident assessment of 
whether the mitigation and minimization measures were working, let 
alone whether the ABM population was continuing to decline.203 Based 
on this uncertainty and the lack of information available on ABM 
population status, the NCEAS team found the ABM HCPs to be 
"risky."204 Overall, the team seriously questioned both the efficacy of 
the mitigation and minimization efforts and whether the ABM HCPs 
were sufficiently conservative in their response to the uncertainties 
concerning the status of the ABM.206 Meanwhile, piecemeal develop-
ment continues to eat away at ABM habitat, fragmenting populations 
and rendering them more susceptible to the effects of potentially 
catastrophic weather events.206 
198 See Shriner Feb. Interview, supra note 181. 
199 Memorandum from Dr. Martha Groom, supra note 178. 
200 See id. 
201 See id. 
202 See id. 
203 See id. 
204 Memorandum from Dr. Martha Groom, supra note 178. 
205 See id. 
206 See id. 
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The ABM HCPs were found to be generally representative of the 
"exceedingly slim biological foundation" of many of the HCPs re-
viewed in the NCEAS study.207 The NCEAS team concluded that the 
most important issue in evaluating HCPs is how each accommodates 
the tremendous uncertainty concerning endangered and threatened 
species.208 The NCEAS team concluded that the ABM HCPs, like 
most others, provide very little in the way of such accommodation.209 
IV. HCPs Go TO COURT 
As Congress debated the 1982 amendment to the ESA to allow 
incidental takes of endangered species, it relied in no small measure 
on a conservation plan prepared by FWS, developers, municipalities, 
and citizens' groups to conserve the Mission Blue Butterfly on the San 
Bruno Mountain on the northern San Francisco Peninsula.210 These 
groups prepared the plan in response to the impending development 
of the mountain by Visitacion Associates, a developer that had pur-
chased most of the land on the mountain.211 Upon FWS's finding that 
the endangered Mission Blue Butterfly inhabited the mountain, the 
various stakeholders together developed a plan to enable develop-
ment of the mountain while preserving butterfly habitat.212 FWS pre-
pared an EA, and based on the resulting FONSI, no EIS was pre-
pared with the San Bruno plan.213 
Congress heralded the San Bruno Mountain conservation plan as 
the model for how to preserve endangered species' habitats while 
enabling development.214 The congressional finding that the plan ac-
tually enhanced the situation of the critically endangered butterfly 
species was a primary reason for the resounding approval of the San 
Bruno Mountain conservation plan.216 Congress viewed the San Bruno 
HCP "as the paradigm approach to compliance with section 10(a)."216 
Indeed, the House Conference Report indicated that the San Bruno 
207 See id. 
208 See id. 
209 Memorandum from Dr. Martha Groom, supra note 178. 
210 See H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at 30-31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2871-72. 
211 See Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d at 979-80. 
212 See id. at 980. 
213 See id. at 980-81. 
214 See S. REP. No. 97-418, at 10 (1982). 
215 See id. 
216 Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d at 982. 
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plan was "the model for the incidental take permit" and the "adequacy 
of other plans should be measured against the San Bruno plan."217 
A. The San Bruno Plan Is First HCP to Be Challenged 
Although Congress lauded the San Bruno plan, environmental or-
ganizations questioned FWS's issuance of an ITP based on the con-
clusion of the BO that the planned development would not jeopardize 
the continued existence of the Mission Blue Butterfly.218 The Friends 
of Endangered Species filed an action in United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California for declaratory and injunctive 
relief, claiming that the field studies used in the BO were methodologi-
cally flawed, and that FWS's reliance on the resulting data was thus 
arbitrary and capricious, and an abuse of the agency's discretion.219 
The plaintiff also argued that the EA prepared by FWS did not fully 
assess the environmental impacts of the proposed development, and 
the resulting FONSI was unsupported.220 Therefore, according to the 
plaintiff, the decision not to issue an EIS was in violation of NEPA.221 
The court granted summary judgment to the developers, FWS, and 
the municipalities on San Bruno Mountain.222 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that FWS's finding that the 
taking of the Mission Blue Butterfly would not reduce the likelihood 
of the species' survival and recovery was adequately supported by 
the field studies used to census the butterfly populations.223 Thus, the 
HCP met the statutory requirement of section 10(a)(2)(B)(iv) of the 
ESA.224 The study used to estimate butterfly distributions on the 
mountain was arguably flawed and resulted in population estimates 
with a high degree of variance.225 Even so, the court found that be-
cause FWS had acknowledged the limitations and had addressed 
them in the permit requirements, the agency had not acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in relying on the study to find that the ITP would 
not appreciably reduce the likelihood of survival of the Mission Blue 
217 H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at 31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2872. 
218 See Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d at 980-81. 
219 See id. at 981 (citing Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 589 F. Supp. 113, 115-18 
(N.D. Calif. 1984)). 
220 See id. 
221 See id. 
222 See id. 
223 See Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d at 982-83. 
224 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv). 
225 See Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d at 983 n.8. 
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Butterfly.226 The fact that the plaintiff did not offer any better data 
from which to make the finding also influenced the court.227 
The Ninth Circuit found that "the Service went beyond the statu-
tory requirement and concluded that the Permit, coupled with the 
[HCP], was likely to enhance the survival of the Mission Blue But-
terfly."228 The court also held that FWS's conclusion that the HCP met 
the section 10(a) requirement that the plan "minimize and mitigate" 
the impact of the taking was supported by the record, and was not 
arbitrary and capricious.229 The plan, which maintained eighty-six 
percent of Mission Blue Butterfly habitat, provided $60,000 annually 
to control incursion of nonnative vegetation into habitat, and included 
"comprehensive restrictions on land development," met the section 
10(a) mitigation requirement.23o The court did not address the further 
requirement under section lO(a) that the ITP applicant minimize and 
mitigate the impacts of the taking "to the maximum extent practica-
ble."231 
The court reviewed FWS's determination that issuance of the San 
Bruno Mountain ITP would not significantly affect the quality of the 
human environment, and thus not require an EIS, under a reason-
ableness standard.232 The court therefore limited its review to 
whether FWS made its decision based on a reasoned analysis of all 
the evidence available to it.233 The court found that the FWS review 
and incorporation of public comments into the permit and the final 
HCP was reasonable, and that no criticisms of the methodology of the 
field study were known to FWS at the time of the permit's approval.234 
The plaintiff in Friends of Endangered Species also argued that, as 
in Foundation for North American Sheep v. U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, public debate over the biological foundation of FWS's 
findings surrounded the issuance of the ITP, and it therefore was 
exactly the type of "controversial action" that required an EIS.235 The 
226 See id. at 983. 
327 See id. at 985. 
228 I d. at 982. 
229 See id. at 984. 
230 See Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d at 984. 
231 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii); see Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d at 984. 
232 See Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d at 985 (citing Foundation for N. Am. Wild 
Sheep v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1982) for "reasonableness" as the 
appropriate standard of review for administrative decisions under NEPA). 
233 See id. at 986. 
234 See id. 
235 See id. (quoting Foundation for N. Am. Sheep, 681 F.2d at 1182). 
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court, however, differentiated the cases based on the fact that in 
Friends of Endangered Species, there was "virtual agreement" be-
tween FWS, the municipality, the developers, and community groups 
as to the sufficiency of the biological data.236 Also, the mitigation 
measures implemented in the San Bruno Mountain HCP "completely 
compensate[d] for any possible adverse environmental impacts," thus 
negating the requirement for an EIS.237 Even if the mitigation meas-
ures did not completely compensate for the environmental impacts of 
the ITP, FWS's FONSI and reSUlting decision not to issue an EIS 
would still have met the reasonableness standard, according to the 
court.238 
B. Alabama Beach Mouse ITPs Challenged by Environmental 
Plaintiffs 
The Sierra Club recently prevailed in federal district court in its 
challenge of FWS's issuance of two ITPs to allow unlimited takes of 
the endangered ABM. Although the case will likely be appealed, the 
district court found that FWS violated provisions of both ESA and 
NEPA.239 
1. Incidental Takes of the ABM Since 1987 
Since FWS published the Recovery Plan for the ABM, the agency 
has issued thirteen ITPs allowing incidental takes of the ABM, most 
to multi-unit residential and condominium developers.24o These devel-
opments, located on approximately 514 acres of privately-owned ABM 
habitat, include sixty-seven acres of habitat designated as critical to 
the survival and recovery of the ABM.241 At least forty-seven acres 
236 Id. 
237 Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d at 987 (quoting Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. 
Peterson, 510 F. Supp. 1186, 1190--91 (D. D.C. 1981), affd 685 F.2d 678, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1982». 
238 See id. 
239 See Sierra Club, 1998 WL 481452, at *11. 
240 See 62 Fed. Reg. 54,121, 54,122 (1997) (eight pennits issued); 60 Fed. Reg. 32,560, 32,561 
(1995) (two pennits issued); 59 Fed. Reg. 33,983, 33,983 (1994) (two pennits issued); 62 Fed. 
Reg. 51,130, 51,130 (1997) (notice of intent to issue one permit). Nine of the thirteen ITPs 
authorizing takes of the ABM have been issued to developers of multi-unit residential proper-
ties. At least one of the thirteen pennits was issued to trap the ABM for the purposes of 
determining presence of the ABM on an applicant's property. See ENSR Consulting and Engi-
neering ITP (PRT-7977735) (Jan. 3, 1995). 
241 These totals were calculated by adding: (1) all the privately-owned acreage included in all 
the ITPs issued; and (2) all critical habitat included in the HCPs, since 1987. See Tidewater 
Assoc. ITP (PRT-832539) (Dec. 2, 1997) (4.3 acres of habitat, none designated critical); Brett 
162 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 26:131 
of ABM habitat have been permanently destroyed by the develop-
ments approved by ITPs.242 FWS has never denied an application 
requesting authorization for an incidental take of the ABM based on 
a jeopardy finding,243 even though the 1987 Recovery Plan predicted 
that the ABM could probably never be de-listed because of the irre-
versible degradation of its habitat.244 
2. Judicial Review of FWS Decisions Under the ESA and NEPA 
The decisions of administrative agencies are subject to judicial 
review, the standard for which can be found in either an organic act 
empowering the agency, or if not so specified, in the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).245 Given that neither the ESA nor NEPA ex-
plicitly prescribe a standard of review for agency decisions made 
pursuant to their provisions, the APA controls; in order to set aside 
an agency action, a reviewing court must make a finding of "arbitrary, 
capricious" agency decision making, agency "abuse of discretion," or 
a decision "otherwise not in accordance with law."246 
Review of agency action under this standard is narrow and pre-
sumes the validity of the agency decision.247 However, even the def-
erential arbitrary and capricious standard under the APA requires a 
review of the administrative record to determine whether the agency 
Real Estate ITP (PRT-808898) (Aug. 3, 1997) (22 acres, none designated critical); Sage Dev. Co., 
L.L.C. ITP (PRT-811416) (May 5, 1997) (35.27 acres of habitat, 10.8 acres designated critical); 
Michalski ITP (PRT-821992) (Jan. 22, 1997) (0.43 acres of habitat, none designated as critical); 
Fort Morgan Paradise Joint Venture ITP (PRT-819464) (Dec. 9, 1996) (86.3 acres of habitat, 16 
designated as critical); Plantation Palms, L.L.C. ITP (PRT-816555) (Nov. 27, 1996) (four acres 
of habitat, none designated as critical); Collins-Miller Dev., Inc. ITP (PRT-819363) (Nov. 8, 1996) 
(11.2 acres of habitat, none designated as critical); Aronov Realty and Mgmt., Inc. ITP (PRT-
802986) (Jan. 26, 1996) (52 acres of habitat, eight designated as critical); Luce ITP (PRT-798697) 
(May 24, 1995) (1.21 acres of habitat, none designated as critical); D&E Investments, Ltd. ITP 
(PRT-787172) (May 3,1994) (251 acres of habitat, 32 designated as critical); Sea Mist, Inc. ITP 
(PRT-784126) (Dec. 27, 1993) (46 acres of habitat, none designated as critical). 
242 This total was calculated by adding all habitat permanently destroyed by the ITPs issued. 
See supra note 241 for a list of permits issued to take the ABM. 
243 See Plaintiffs Brief II, supra note 33, at 12. 
244 See ABM RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 105, at 12. 
m See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994); see also David Sive, The Scope and Depth of Judicial Review of 
Environmental Administrative Action, SA85 ALI-ABA 47, 49 (1996). 
246 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
247 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984) (''We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle 
of deference to administrative interpretations."); Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 
1975). 
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made a reasonable decision.248 An agency action is to be set aside 
where the agency has "entirely failed to consider an important aspect 
of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs coun-
ter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could 
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.''249 To survive judicial scrutiny of a decision not to prepare 
an EIS, an agency must take a "hard look at [the] environmental 
consequences" of its actions.25o 
Where the issue is one of an agency's statutory interpretation, as 
with FWS's reliance on a survival standard as opposed to a recovery 
standard under ESA section lO(a), the framework set out in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council controls.251 The 
Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Chevron prescribed a new level of 
judicial deference in reviewing agency decisions through application 
of a two-step inquiry.252 The first step is to determine, through use of 
"traditional tools of statutory construction," whether Congress "un-
ambiguously expressed [its] intent."253 
In determining congressional intent, Chevron did not sanction reli-
ance on the general purpose of a statute.254 In the case of Babbitt v. 
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, however, 
the Supreme Court freely engaged in a review of the broad purpose 
of the ESA to determine whether Congress intended the word 
"harm" as defined in the statute to include "significant habitat 
modification," as the regulations promulgated by the DOl specified.255 
For this reason, Sweet Home has been regarded as strengthening 
248 See Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
249Id. 
250 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976). 
251 467 U.S. at 842-45. 
252 See id. at 842. However, questions have been posed as to whether Chevron set out a general 
principle of judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes, or just to agency gap-filling. 
See PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 591. 
253 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
264 Id. at 843 n.9. The Court of Appeals made a "basic legal error" by basing its answer to the 
question of whether Congress had spoken on the meaning of "stationary source" in the Clean 
Air Act on the Act's purpose to improve air qUality. Id. at 842; see also Simona Papuian, Sweet 
Home's Effect on the Chevron Doctrine and the Increased Role of the Judiciary in Reviewing 
Agency Statutory Interpretations, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 543, 561 (1996) (asserting that when 
the judiciary resorts to the general purpose of the statute to answer an interpretive matter, it 
"engages in a policy-balancing test that is the task of legislative bodies, not the courts"). 
255 515 U.S. at 698 ("[T]he broad purpose of the ESA supports the Secretary's decision to 
extend protection against activities that cause the precise harms Congress enacted the statute 
to avoid."). 
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judicial review of agency interpretation of statutes, and as weakening 
Chevron by placing less emphasis on the congressional intent of the 
specific provision being interpreted.256 
Under Chevron, if congressional intent is ultimately determined to 
be ambiguous or silent with regard to the salient issue, the court will 
proceed to the second part of the inquiry, which addresses whether 
the agency has articulated a "permissible construction" of the stat-
ute.257 When Congress leaves an explicit gap for an agency to fill, for 
example when a statute provides the agency with an affirmative duty 
to define a term, then there is an "express delegation of authority to 
the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regula-
tion."268 In the case of such an explicit gap, the court will uphold the 
agency's interpretation unless it is "arbitrary, capricious or manifestly 
contrary to the statute."259 
If, however, the gap left by Congress is implicitly rather than 
explicitly delegated, as when the statute is silent as to the meaning 
of the relevant provision, the agency construction must be a "reason-
able interpretation" of the statute.260 In Sweet Home, congressional 
silence as to the definition of "harm" lead the Court to review the 
DOl's definition as filling an implicit gap in the ESA.261 The Court 
relied heavily on the legislative history of the provision, and found 
that inclusion of "significant habitat modification" in the definition of 
''harm'' was a reasonable interpretation under the ESA.262 
3. The Sierra Club Challenges 1\vo Alabama Beach Mouse HCPs 
In 1997, an environmental group was the first to challenge FWS's 
issuance of ITPs since the Ninth Circuit upheld the San Bruno Moun-
tain ITP in 1985.263 In its suit against FWS, the Sierra Club claimed 
that FWS issuance of ITPs to Aronov and to Paradise Joint Venture 
266 See Martha F. Phelps, Comment, Candidate Conservation Agreements Under the Endan-
gered Species Act: Prospects and Perils of an Administrative Experiment, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L.R. 175,203 (1997); see also Papazian, supra note 254, at 544. 
257 467 U.S. at 843. 
266 [d. at 843-44. 
259 [d. at 844. 
2fiO [d. 
261 515 U.S. at 704. "Harm" was defined by DOl as including "significant habitat modification 
or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential 
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. 
262 [d. 
263 See Sierra Club, 1998 WL 481452, at *1. 
1998] HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS 165 
for the development of condominium projects in dunal areas known 
to be inhabited by the ABM violated the ESA and NEPA.264 Aronov 
plans to build a complex on fifty-two acres of beachfront on the Fort 
Morgan Peninsula.265 The project will include two three-story mid-rise 
residential buildings with landscaped grounds, roads, parking area, a 
beach club located partially in the scrub dunes, multi- and single 
family housing with roads, and a dune walkover structure through the 
ABM critical habitat.266 Paradise Joint Venture plans to build a con-
dominium complex on eighty-six acres of Fort Morgan Peninsula 
beachfront with 753 residential units in four sixteen-story high-rise 
buildings, roads, four outdoor pools, tennis courts, parking garages, 
and dune walkovers through ABM critical habitat.267 Trapping results 
conducted by the developers found ABM distributed throughout the 
Paradise Joint Venture and Aronov project sites.268 
For both projects, FWS and DOl prepared EAs and subsequent 
FONSls, pursuant to NEPA section 102(2)(c).269 FWS also prepared 
BOs for both projects to determine whether either development 
would jeopardize the continued existence of the ABM.270 FWS found, 
based on the HCP mitigation and minimization measures proposed by 
both applicants, that neither development would appreciably reduce 
the likelihood of survival and recovery of the ABM.271 FWS therefore 
issued both permits.272 
The claims made by the Sierra Club in support of its motion for 
summary judgment273 included the following: (1) The FONSls for both 
264 See Plaintiff's Brief I, supra note 31, at 15, 21. 
265 See Biological Opinion: Aronov Realty Management, Inc. Request for an Incidental Take 
Permit for the Endangered Alabama Beach Mouse in Baldwin County, Alabama, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, at 4 (1996) [hereinafter Aronov BO] (At the time the suit commenced, both 
projects at issue were already under construction.). 
266 See iii. 
267 See Paradise Joint Venture BO, supra note 124, at 2, 20. 
268 See id. at 2; Final Environmental Assessment, Issuance of an Incidental Take Permit for 
the Alabama Beach Mouse to Aronov Realty Management, Inc. for the Construction and 
Occupancy of Martinique on the Gulf, a Residential Subdivision in Baldwin County, Alabama, 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, at 3 (1996) [hereinafter Aronov EAJ. 
269 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c); see also Aronov BO, supra note 265, at 37; Paradise Joint 
Venture BO, supra note 124, at 26-27. 
270 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c); see also Aronov BO, supra note 265, at 37; Paradise Joint Venture 
BO, supra note 124, at 26-27. 
271 Paradise Joint Venture BO, supra note 124, at 26-27. 
272 See Fort Morgan Paradise Joint Venture ITP (PRT-819464) (Dec. 9, 1996); Aronov Realty 
and Mgmt., Inc. ITP (PRT-802986) (Jan. 26,1996). 
273 See Sierra Club, 1998 WL 481452, at *1. Upon transfer of venue, the parties stipulated that 
the plaintiff's original motion for preliminary injunction would be treated as a motion for 
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projects were "arbitrary and capricious" and contrary to the admin-
istrative record;274 (2) The HCPs submitted by the applicants did not 
minimize and mitigate the impacts of the ABM taking "to the maxi-
mum extent practicable," and thus they were in violation of section 
10(a);275 (3) FWS's finding that there will be no adverse impact to 
critical habitat was in violation of ESA section 7, was contrary to the 
administrative record, and thus was arbitrary and capricious;276 and 
(4) FWS violated its section 7 obligation to ensure that the agency's 
actions would not "jeopardize the continued existence" of the ABM 
when the agency failed to seriously review the cumulative impacts of 
previously-issued ITPs.277 These primary arguments, and the FWS 
responses to them, are discussed below. 
4. The NEPA Claims 
The Sierra Club claimed that the administrative record "provide[d] 
a grossly insufficient basis for FWS' conclusions," and as a result, the 
FONSIs issued for the two projects were arbitrary and capricious and 
in violation of NEPA.278 Sierra Club cited the fact that in the EAs for 
the projects, FWS was not even able to provide an estimate of the 
number of ABM remaining, the number that the projects' construc-
tion would kill and disrupt, the distributions of remaining ABM, or of 
the minimal viable ABM population.279 According to the plaintiff, FWS 
could not possibly know the impact of the ABM takings associated 
with construction of the two projects, or whether that impact is 
"significant," without this data.280 Without rangewide baseline popu-
lation data, the argument continued, "there [was] nothing by which 
to measure whether these projects will significantly impact the viabil-
ity of the species."281 
FWS responded in its opposition brief that its decision not to is-
sue an EIS required a sophisticated scientific evaluation that "impli-
summary judgment. This was due to the advanced state of the developments at issue. Sierra 
Club asked that the court suspend the ITPs "until FWS could revise its environmental analysis, 
permit conditions, and conservation plans to comport with the law." [d. 
274 Plaintiff's Brief II, supra note 33, at 2. 
276 [d. at 18. 
276 See id. at 14. 
277 See Plaintiff's Brief I, supra note 31, at 32. 
278 See Plaintiff's Brief II, supra note 33, at 3. 
279 See id. at 4-5. 
280 See id. at 7. 
281 [d. at 8. 
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cate[d] substantial agency expertise," and therefore the court should 
defer to the decision.282 The agency did not, however, address the 
apparent lack of information concerning the population densities, dis-
tribution, and rangewide estimates of the remaining ABM in its de-
termination that the developments would have no significant impact 
on the survival and recovery of the species.283 
The district court agreed with Sierra Club, finding the FONSIs to 
be based on "insufficient, inaccurate, old and out of date data.''284 In 
making its finding, the court noted that the administrative records of 
both FONSIs contained no data on current or past ABM population 
trends, and no information on minimal viable populations.285 Without 
this information, the court continued, FWS could not possibly esti-
mate the impact of the taking, and it thus could not reasonably state 
that the projects would not have a significant impact.286 The FONSIs 
were thus arbitrary and capricious, and the court ordered they be 
remanded to FWS so the agency could collect the necessary data and 
prepare new EAs to determine the impact of the projects.287 
5. The ESA Claims 
a. Section 10 
Sierra Club contended that the HCPs for the condominium devel-
opments violated the section 10(a) mandate that the ITP applicant 
will minimize and mitigate the impacts of the taking "to the maximum 
extent practicable.''288 According to Sierra Club, the HCPs at issue did 
not meet this requirement because FWS approved these ITPs to 
destroy and fragment ABM habitat, while not requiring the purchase 
of any additional habitat to compensate for what the applicants will 
take.289 Although the Paradise Joint Venture and Aronov HCPs pro-
vide for $150,000 and $60,000 for mitigation measures, respectively, 
FWS does not require these funds to be used for the purchase of ABM 
282 See Defendants' Brief, supra note 102, at 12 (citing Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources 
Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376 (1989». 
283 See generally Defendants' Brief, supra note 102. 
284 Sierra Club, 1998 WL 481452, at *9. 
286 See id. at 9-10. 
286 See id. at 10. 
287 See id. 
288 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii); see also Plaintiff's Brief II, supra note 33, at 18. 
289 See id. at 41. 
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habitat.290 No such compensation is required by FWS even though the 
1987 ABM Recovery Plan indicated that there was already insuf-
ficient habitat for the ABM to ever be de-listed.291 As previously 
discussed, FWS interprets the congressional mandate of section lO(a) 
to embrace no such enhancement requirement.292 
In addition, Sierra Club argued that FWS never showed that the 
measures included in either conservation plan minimize and mitigate 
to the maximum extent practicable.293 To the contrary, FWS staff 
found that although the Paradise Joint Venture project will have the 
largest biological effects of any ABM HCP to date, it also has the 
fewest mitigation measures required of it.294 
Here again, the district court agreed with the Sierra Club plain-
tiff.295 First, the court specifically found that the lack of any analysis 
in the administrative record of whether the mitigation measures were 
to the maximum extent practicable rendered the ITPs arbitrary and 
capricious.296 The court found persuasive the fact that FWS's field 
office in Jackson, Mississippi had expressed concern that the mitiga-
tion required of the Paradise Joint Venture project was very low in 
comparison to its impact.297 The court chastised FWS for "simply 
ignor[ing] the clearly expressed concerns of the experts Congress 
intended the agency to rely upon in making such discretionary deci-
sions."29B 
The district court also found that in authorizing ITPs with such low 
levels of mitigation, FWS ignored the agency's own guidelines calling 
for use of consistent mitigation policies for the same species.299 Lastly, 
FWS's speCUlative reliance on unnamed nonprofit organizations to 
supplement the mitigation funds could not enable the agency to meet 
the requirement that mitigation of the projects' impacts to the maxi-
mum extent practicable.3°O 
290 See Paradise Joint Venture BO, SU'JIM note 124, at 18; Aronov BO, su'JIM note 265, at 29. 
291 See ABM RECOVERY PLAN, Bupra note 105, at 12. 
292 See Bupra Section lILA and accompanying notes for a discussion of whether section 10(a) 
of the ESA prescribes a recovery standard for HCP review. 
293 See Plaintiffs Brief II, Bupra note 33, at 18-20. 
294 See id. at 20. 
295 See Sierra Club, 1998 WL 481452, at *6. 
296 See id. 
297 See id. 
298 [d. 
299 See id. at 7 (citing the HCP Handbook's guidance that consistency of mitigation is "essen-
tial"). 
300 See Sierra Club, 1998 WL 481452, at *8. 
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The difference between Friends of Endangered Species and Sierra 
Club is illustrative of the disparity between the recovery standard 
and the survival standard currently employed by FWS in HCP re-
view.30l In Friends of Endangered Species, the court found that not 
only were the developments' impacts minimized and mitigated to the 
maximum extent practicable, but the measures employed by the RCP 
actually provided an overall benefit to the endangered Mission Blue 
Butterfly.302 In Sierra Club, however, there is substantial evidence 
that the ABM will be worse off after the RCPs are implemented than 
before, given that 44.5 additional acres of its habitat are to be com-
pletely destroyed.803 
b. Section 7 
The Sierra Club also claimed that FWS's finding that no adverse 
impact to critical habitat of the ABM will result from the construction 
of the two condominium complexes is in violation of section 7 of the 
ESA. 304 The Sierra Club pointed out that if the grant of an ITP under 
section lO(a) would allow an activity that destroys or adversely 
modifies the critical habitat of an endangered species, issuance of the 
permit would violate ESA section 7(a)(2).305 
Recall that vegetated scrub dunes run parallel to the primary and 
secondary dunes on the Fort Morgan Peninsula, and that the critical 
habitat of the ABM is found in the primary dunes along the shore-
line.806 Sierra Club argued that destruction of the scrub dune habitat 
laterally adjacent to the primary dunes of critical habitat adversely 
modifies that critical habitat, because the ABM trapped in the critical 
habitat during storms that overwash the primary dunes will be unable 
to escape.307 This is because development (buildings, swimming pools, 
roads, etc.) in the scrub dunes will effectively block the ABM's retreat 
away from their submerged burrows.8OS Based on biological data from 
SOl See Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d at 984; Sierra Club, 1998 WL 481452, at *8 
(finding that the administrative record was "devoid of any rational basis upon which the FWS 
could have reasonably relied in deciding to issue the ITPs"). 
302 760 F.2d at 984. 
303 See Aronov BO, supra note 265, at 23; Paradise Joint Venture BO, supra note 124, at 17. 
Together the two projects will destroy 44.5 acres of ABM-occupied habitat, which clearly will 
leave the species in an even more tenuous state than before the ITPs were issued. See id. 
S04 See Plaintiff's Brief I, supra note 31, at 37. 
305 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); see also Plaintiffs Brief II, supra note 33, at 14. 
306 See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ABM's habitat. 
807 See Plaintiffs Brief II, supra note 33, at 16. 
308 See id. 
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FWS and independent scientists, Sierra Club claimed that ABM must 
be able to move between the primary, secondary, and scrub dunes to 
avoid drowning and to recolonize after storms.BOg Thus "the value and 
utility of the primary dunes are inextricably tied to the secondary and 
scrub dunes, which are to be destroyed by the projects at issue in this 
case."310 Isolation of the critical habitat in the primary dunes as a 
result of condominium development therefore renders that habitat 
less valuable to the ABM, an effect that should be considered to 
adversely modify critical habitat, in violation of section 7 according to 
Sierra Club.3ll 
FWS responded that only areas physically within the boundaries of 
critical habitat are to be considered for the purposes of determining 
"adverse modification."312 The agency also contended that since only 
primary dunes are included in the designated critical habitat of the 
ABM, and since scrub dunes "were never determined to be essential 
to the conservation of the species by the FWS," fragmentation of the 
primary dunes by development of the adjacent scrub dunes does not 
adversely modify critical habitat, and thus does not violate section 
7(a)(2).313 However, as noted in the Paradise Joint Venture BO, FWS 
found that "scrub dunes occupied by ABM can function as crucial 
refugia during severe hurricanes that overwash, flood, and destroy 
most of the lower frontal and secondary dunes. Scrub dunes are also 
considered to be instrumental in repopulating the primary dunes 
after a storm event."314 In the same BO, FWS wrote that "long term 
survival for the species may depend crucially upon storm refugia for 
a founding population to recolonize seaward habitat."315 
In addition to the adverse modification of critical habitat by the 
destruction of adjacent scrub dunes, Sierra Club also claimed that the 
walkovers to be constructed directly through the primary dune habi-
tat would adversely modify such habitat in violation of section 
7(a)(2).316 Although the walkovers were mitigation measures included 
in both HCPs at issue, Sierra Club cited FWS's admission that "[c]on-
struction activities . . . may impact ABM by crushing or entombing 
309 See id. 
310Id. 
311 See id. at 15-16. 
312 See Defendants' Brief, supra note 102, at 22 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.94(c». 
313Id. 
314 Paradise Joint Venture BO, supra note 124, at 4 (emphasis added). 
315Id. 
316 See Plaintiffs Brief II, supra note 33, at 17 n.6. 
1998] HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS 171 
animals in their burrows, or by impairing essential breeding, feeding, 
or sheltering behaviors" as evidence that the walkovers would ad-
versely impact ABM critical habitat.317 Further, even assuming that 
beachgoers would utilize the walkovers instead of walking directly on 
the dunes, Sierra Club argued that increased human use would nec-
essarily have a detrimental impact on critical habitat.818 
The district court did not base its decision to set aside the ITPs on 
the claim of adverse modification of critical habitat in violation of ESA 
section 7(a)(2).819 The court did not reach this claim.320 
The Sierra Club also claimed that FWS excluded the cumulative 
effects of all the previous ABM ITPs from its analysis of the impacts 
of the two latest ITPs, thus violating the section 7 requirement that 
the service ''insure'' that its actions are "not likely to jeopardize the 
continued existence" of the ABM.B21 FWS responded that the environ-
mental baseline calculated for ABM habitat and included in the BOs 
for both developments does incorporate all previous ITPs, thus their 
cumulative effects have been addressed.822 The district court, how-
ever, found that the baseline used by the agency was not useful for 
determining impacts of incremental habitat loss on the ABM, because 
the agency had no data on population trends to compare against the 
baseline.828 
v. ANALYSIS 
A. Summary 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
should uphold the district court's decision to set aside the ITPs at 
issue in Sierra Club. This holding should be based on FWS's failure 
to adequately support the FONSIs for either project, and on the 
agency's violations of ESA's section 7 requirement that the authorized 
take not adversely modify critical habitat and the section 10 require-
ment that ITP applicants mitigate the impact of their takes "to the 
maximum extent practicable."824 
317Id. (quoting Aronov EA, supra note 268, at 3). 
318 See Plaintiff's Brief II, supra note 33, at 18 n.6. 
319 See generally Sierra Club, 1998 WL 481452. 
~See id. 
321 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); see Plaintiff's Brief I, supra note 31, at 34-35. 
322 See Defendants' Brief, supra note 102, at 24-25. 
323 See Sierra Club, 1998 WL 481452, at *9. 
324 See id. at *11 (order remanding ITPs to FWS). 
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The policy of FWS that HCPs in general do not require the prepa-
ration of an EIS to meet the requirements of NEPA should not save 
the agency from inquiry into whether the agency could support a 
finding of no significant impact in specific cases.825 Based on the cumu-
lative impacts of both developments and the lack of basic information 
on ABM populations, the FONSIs issued in this case were conclusory 
and not consistent with the information the agency had before it.326 
In addition, in issuing the ITPs, FWS violated the section 7 require-
ment that the authorized take not adversely modify critical habitat.327 
The agency narrowly interpreted the meaning of adverse modification 
so as to artificially limit it to activities occurring within the boundaries 
of critical habitat, and did not take into account activities that take 
place outside critical habitat that negatively impact the value of such 
habitat.328 FWS also violated section 10 of the ESA by failing to show 
that the applicants in Sierra Club took steps to mitigate the impact 
of their takes of the ABM "to the maximum extent practicable.''J29 
Nowhere in the administrative record on the two ITPs did the agency 
assert that the HCPs in question were reviewed to ensure compliance 
with this standard.330 
The ESA section 10(a) requirement that any incidental take of an 
endangered species "not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the spe-
cies' survival and recovery" could arguably require FWS to imple-
ment a recovery standard.33l Support for such a standard emanates 
from the conservation goal appearing throughout the text of the ESA 
and the legislative history of the section 10(a) amendment.332 Inter-
pretation of such a recovery requirement in the review of HCPs could 
survive the judicial deference mandated by Chevron,333 when read in 
the context of Sweet Home's reassertion of some measure of judicial 
control.334 
Finally, policy reasons also support the implementation of a recov-
ery standard as opposed to a survival standard in HCP review. Equi-
table principles dictate that recipients of an exemption from the ESA's 
326 HCP HANDBOOK, sU'J11"a note 19, at 5-3. 
326 See Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43. 
327 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
328 See 50 C.F.R. § 17.94(c)j see also Defendants' Brief, BU'J11"a note 102, at 22. 
329 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
330 See generally Aronov BO, SU'J11"a note 265j Paradise Joint Venture BO, BU'J11"a note 124. 
331 [d. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv)j see also Plaintiffs Brief I, sU'J11"a note 31, at 39-40. 
332 H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at 31 (1982), re'J11"inted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2872. 
333 467 U.S. at 842j see also Papazian, BU'J11"a note 254, at 544 (arguing that the Chevron 
standard of review for administrative actions was weakened by Sweet Home). 
334 515 U.S. at 698. 
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section 9 prohibitions should be responsible for ensuring that the 
exemption does not thwart the goals of the law. Another policy reason 
for the implementation of a recovery standard in the interpretation 
of section 10 is preservation of the important "indicator" role played 
by endangered species.335 
B. The District Court's Decision in Sierra Club v. Babbitt Should 
Be Upheld on Appeal 
1. The FONSIs Are Arbitrary and Capricious 
FWS's own EAs did not support the FONSIs it issued for either 
HCP. There was simply not enough basic biological information on the 
remaining ABM populations and on the impact of the proposed takes 
to make a "clear finding" of no significant environmental impact.336 Not 
only did the FONSIs violate FWS policy as articulated in the HCP 
Handbook, the FWS also: (1) failed "to examine the relevant data and 
articulate a satisfactory explanation for [its] action;" (2) failed "to 
consider an important aspect of the problem;" and (3) "offered an 
explanation for [the] decision that runs counter to the evidence before 
the agency."337 Thus, the FONSIs are arbitrary and capricious.336 
First, by issuing these FONSIs, FWS failed to examine data rele-
vant to its decision.339 FWS has known since it published the ABM 
Recovery Plan in 1987 that continued commercial and residential 
development of the Fort Morgan Peninsula made it unlikely that 
there would be enough suitable habitat left for the ABM to ever 
recover.340 Since that time, development of multi-unit residential com-
plexes has destroyed forty-seven acres of occupied ABM habitat, and 
affected hundreds more.341 The agency was further unable to provide 
a satisfactory explanation for issuing these FONSIs, instead including 
in the EAs and BOs for both projects a conclusory statement that the 
ITPs would not jeopardize the continued existence of the ABM.342 
Based on this assertion, FWS contends that the developments at issue 
335 See Plater, supra note 39, at 853. 
336 Hep HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 5-4. 
337 Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43. 
338 See id. 
339 See id. 
340 See ABM RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 105, at 12. 
34! See supra note 241 and accompanying text for the calculation of affected ABM habitat and 
the ITPs included in the calculation. 
342 See Aronov EA, supra note 268, at 33; Aronov BO, supra note 265, at 37; Paradise Joint 
Venture BO, supra note 124, at 26-27. 
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will not have significant impact on the environment, and thus are 
deserving of FONSIs.848 But FWS has provided no particularized 
findings in support of these circular statements.844 
Second, by failing to address the absence of population data and the 
effect of the take on the remaining ABM in its decision not to prepare 
an EIS for either project, FWS failed to "consider an important aspect 
of the problem."845 The scientific community considers information on 
the population and number of individuals taken to be instrumental in 
the assessment of impacts, so clearly the lack of such information 
qualifies as an "important aspect" to be considered in the decision to 
issue a FONSJ.846 Nor should the agency be able to support a conten-
tion that it considered such biological information simply by admitting 
that the data was not available.847 
Third, FWS's explanation for the issuance of the FONSIs runs 
counter to the information that was before the agency. FWS contends 
that the mitigation measures included in the HCPs, taken together, 
lower the impacts of the takings below the "significant" level which 
would require preparation of an EIS.848 However, FWS provided no 
estimate of the proportion of the ABM popUlation that may be "saved" 
by the measures, and only indicated that lack of data on the ABM 
"create[d] uncertainty in determining mitigation for the habitat val-
ues unavoidably destroyed by construction.''849 So FWS had tenuous 
grounds on which to base any claim of lessened impact due to mitiga-
tion. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that FWS did not adequately 
account for the lack of basic biological data before making its decision 
to issue FONSIs for the Aronov and Paradise Joint Venture projects. 
The decision not to prepare an EIS in the absence of such data ran 
counter to the information the agency did have, namely that the ABM 
would move ever closer to extinction with each successive incursion 
343 See id. 
344 See id. 
345 Motar Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43. 
346 See supra notes 184-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the importance of species 
population data in the assessment of ITP impacts, as articulated by the NCEAS. 
347 See Aronov EA, supra note 268, at 32 ("The risk cannot ... be precisely quantified because 
of the lack of rangewide data for the ABM required to assess population and habitat viability 
and minimally viable population size."); Paradise Joint Venture BO, supra note 124, at 26-27 
("Reliable rangewide estimates of ABM population size and density are not available." "Accu-
rate ABM density estimates are not available."). 
348 See Paradise Joint Venture EA, supra note 109, at 23; see also HCP HANDBOOK, supra 
note 19, at 5-3. 
349 Paradise Joint Venture EA, supra note 109, at 23. 
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into its habitat. The district court's holding that the issuance of these 
FONSIs was arbitrary and capricious is well-supported by the re-
cord.350 
2. The FWS Did Not Adequately Address Cumulative Impacts 
The FWS must include past, present, and foreseeable future im-
pacts in its analysis of cumulative impacts under NEPA and cumula-
tive effects under ESA.351 
a. Cumulative Impacts Under NEPA 
The EAs prepared by FWS for both the Aronov and Paradise Joint 
Venture projects have sections titled "Cumulative Impacts," with 
subsections "Past Impacts," "Other Present Impacts," and "Future 
Impacts."352 So, seemingly, and as FWS vigorously asserted, these 
impacts were addressed in the agency's analysis of whether the de-
velopments at issue would "significantly affect the quality of the 
human environment."353 However, in the "Past Impacts" section, FWS 
merely recounted the number of acres of ABM habitat impacted or 
destroyed by each successive project, with no analysis of the effect 
this will have on remaining ABM populations.354 In fact, after citing 
the ABM habitat destroyed and modified thus far, FWS stated in the 
Aronov EA that the "actual number of ABM incidentally taken on 
these sites cannot be accurately estimated."355 
FWS similarly discussed "future impacts" in the EAs for both 
projects.356 Not surprisingly, the agency concluded in the Aronov BO 
that it is very likely to receive additional applications for ITPs as the 
Fort Morgan Peninsula is "transformed from an undeveloped sea-
shore to a destination resort and municipal area.''.l57 However, because 
the specific characteristics of each future development project cannot 
be pinpointed before the applications are received, FWS refers to the 
impacts of such development as "unforeseeable."358 Because NEPA 
analysis of prospective impacts is limited to "reasonably foreseeable 
350 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a); see also Sierra Club, 1998 WL 481452, at *10. 
351 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. 
352 Paradise Joint Venture EA, supra note 109, at 16-17; Aronov EA, supra note 268, at 20-26. 
353 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
354 Paradise Joint Venture EA, supra note 109, at 17; Aronov EA, supra note 268, at 22-26. 
355 Aronov EA, supra note 268, at 23. 
356 See id. at 24; Paradise Joint Venture EA, supra note 109, at 17-18. 
357 Aronov BO, supra note 265, at 31. 
358 Aronov EA, supra note 268, at 25. 
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future actions," FWS does not include future development of multi-
family housing and condominiums in the cumulative impact analysis 
under NEPA.359 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that FWS so narrowly construes 
its duty to address cumulative impacts under NEPA that each EA in 
reality offers nothing but a running tabulation of the ABM habitat 
impacted or destroyed thus far. Couple this practice with FWS's 
reliance on a survival standard in its review of HCPs, and it is clear 
that the agency will continue to approve each successive ITP until it 
becomes painfully obvious that a specific proposed development will 
push the ABM over the brink and into extinction. This practice is not 
only shortsighted, but it encourages a rush to develop what remains 
of privately-owned ABM habitat, lest an applicant be the last land-
owner left standing without a chair. 
The analogy used by the Sierra Club illustrates this situation well: 
with a thousand straws placed one at a time on the proverbial camel's 
back, it is impossible to ascertain which one causes the ultimate in-
jury.360 Such is the case with the thirteen small to mid-size ABM HCPs 
that FWS has approved thus far.361 The agency has never refused to 
issue an ITP to take the ABM, and it has never issued an EIS in 
conjunction with any of the ABM ITPs.362 This is the case even though 
the ABM has lost 18.2%-almost one-fifth-of its rangewide habitat 
to development.363 
b. Cumulative Effects Under ESA 
The ESA requires incorporation of cumulative effects from pre-
viously issued ITPs in the analysis of whether the ITP in question is 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the ABM.364 With each 
successive ITP, the environmental baseline against which FWS meas-
ures those effects theoretically incorporates the loss of habitat from 
all other ITPs.365 But FWS has provided no guidance as to when the 
loss of ABM habitat from development will become so acute as to for-
359 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (emphasis added); see also Aronov EA, supra note 268, at 25. 
360 See Plaintiff's Brief I, supra note 31, at 34--35. 
361 See supra note 241 for a list of ABM ITPs approved thus far. 
362 See Plaintiff's Brief II, supra note 33, at 13. 
363 See Paradise Joint Venture BO, supra note 124, at 22. 
364 See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
365 See supra Section LC.3 and accompanying notes for a discussion of cumulative effects 
analysis under ESA. 50 C.F.R. § 404.02 provides the definition of cumulative effects under ESA. 
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mally "jeopardize" the ABM's existence.366 So although the environ-
mental baseline should be an accurate reflection of remaining ABM 
habitat and it includes what is known about ABM populations, the 
effects of the proposed development are not then analyzed to deter-
mine at what point the jeopardy threshold would be reached.367 In the 
BOs at issue, FWS provided no discussion to support a finding of no 
jeopardy in the face of such rapidly dwindling habitat, but rather 
ended with a conclusory statement that the developments will not 
cause jeopardy.36s This approach seems to reduce cumulative effects 
analysis under the ESA to a scorekeeping function in which each new 
BO simply tabulates the decrease in habitat resulting from the last 
ITP. 
3. The ABM ITPs Violate Section 7 of the ESA 
The Paradise Joint Venture and Aronov HCPs also violate ESA's 
section 7 requirement that the ITPs not "result in the destruction or 
adverse modification" of critical habitat.369 As the Sierra Club plaintiff 
argued, the isolation of the critical habitat in the primary dunes from 
secondary and scrub dunes will undoubtedly lower the intrinsic value 
of the critical habitat to the ABM.370 To make its contrary finding, 
FWS relied on regulations promulgated under section 7 specifying 
that "[c]ritical habitat management focuses only on the biological or 
physical constituent elements within the defined area of Critical Habi-
tat that are essential to the conservation of the species."371 FWS 
interprets this to mean that "adverse modification" can only apply to 
activities within the discrete boundaries of critical habitat that affect 
elements deemed essential to the conservation of species.372 Further, 
"those major constituent elements ... will be listed with the descrip-
tion of the Critical Habitat."373 FWS argued in its brief that since it 
366 Paradise Joint Venture BO, supra note 124, at 26. FWS painstakingly relates the total 
number of acres of ABM habitat destroyed and the percentage of the original range remaining, 
but the agency makes no assessment of how this loss of habitat will impact the ABM. FWS 
concludes the analysis with a statement that "the issuance of the ITP to Paradise Joint Venture, 
Inc. is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the ABM." ld. 
367 See Aronov BO, supra note 265, at 23-29. 
368 See id. at 15-23, 37; Paradise Joint Venture BO, supra note 124, at 26-27. 
369 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
370 See Plaintiff's Brief II, supra note 33, at 16. 
371 50 C.F.R. § 17.94(c); Defendants' Brief, supra note 102, at 22. 
372 See Defendants' Brief, supra note 102, at 22. 
373 50 C.F.R. § 17.94(c). 
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did not include scrub dune habitat in either the original critical habitat 
designation or as an element essential to ABM conservation in the 
1987 Recovery Plan, fragmentation and destruction of scrub dunes 
cannot be "adverse modification."374 But the regulations to which FWS 
referred nowhere state that adverse modification under section 7 is 
exclusively delineated by the aforementioned language.375 The regu-
lations cited by FWS do not mention adverse modification at all.376 
FWS further contended that the agency never found scrub dune 
habitat to be essential to the existence of the ABM.377 After the 
publication of the Recovery Plan in 1987, however, one area of con-
sensus among biologists and FWS emerged-the importance of the 
scrub dune habitat as a refugia for ABM during storms that overwash 
the primary dunes.378 The NCEAS agreed that scrub dunes were used 
for this purpose,379 FWS scientists found it to be the case,3BO and the 
administrative record of the ITPs at issue also specifically stated the 
importance of the scrub dunes to the ABM habitat.381 
Section 7(a) of the ESA clearly requires that the determination of 
adverse modification be based on the ''best scientific and commercial 
data available."382 The biological information contained in the 1987 
Recovery Plan could no longer be considered to meet this require-
ment, given the changes to ABM habitat that have occurred in the 
subsequent eleven years, as well as the additional information that 
has been discovered about the species since that time. Therefore, the 
fact that the 1987 Recovery Plan failed to articulate the value of scrub 
374 See Defendants' Brief, supra note 102, at 22. 
375 See 50 C.F.R. § 17.94. 
376 See id. 
377 See Defendants' Brief, supra note 102, at 22. 
378 Paradise Joint Venture BO, supra note 124, at 4. See supra Section V.B.5.b and accompa-
nying notes for a discussion of the role of the scrub dunes in the conservation of the ABM and 
the FWS opinion that they are "instrumental in repopulating the primary dunes after a storm 
event." [d. 
379 Telephone Interview with Dr. Martha Groom, Department of Zoology, North Carolina State 
University (Jan. 23, 1998). 
380 See Plaintiff's Brief II, supra note 33, at 15. Dr. Nicholas Holler, contract biologist for the 
FWS, stated in a memo to FWS that "Loss of the scrub dune component will result in a 
permanent lowering of the value of the primary dunes to support a Beach Mouse population 
over a long period of time." [d. (quoting Nicholas Holler Memorandum to FWS, Nov. 5, 1996). 
381 See Paradise Joint Venture BO, supra note 124, at 4; see also Aronov BO, supra note 265, 
at 6-7 ("As ABM habitat and populations become fragmented and isolated, long term survival 
for the species may depend crucially upon storm refugia for a founding popUlation to recolonize 
seaward habitat .... Optimal ABM habitat consists of a complete dune system with spatially 
connected and well-developed frontal, secondary and scrub dunes.") (emphasis added). 
382 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
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dunes to the ABM cannot be used by FWS to justify its failure in 1997 
to recognize what virtually every scientist who has studied the ABM 
already knows: isolation of the primary dunes from the scrub dunes 
will adversely modify ABM critical habitat.383 
As with cumulative impacts analysis, FWS takes an extremely 
narrow view of "adverse modification."384 This FWS interpretation 
leads to strange results, because it appears that anything can happen 
outside the technical bounds of critical habitat, and although the 
activity may have a devastating impact upon the critical habitat, as 
long as nothing physically reaches over the boundary, it cannot violate 
the section 7(a)(2) prohibition of adverse modification of critical habi-
tat. 
Just as troubling is FWS's contention that construction of dune 
walkovers through critical habitat and the attendant human traffic on 
the dunes is not adverse modification.385 The walkovers clearly meet 
FWS's regulatory interpretation stipulating that adverse modification 
must fall within the physical boundaries of critical habitat. 386 Accord-
ing to FWS, the walkovers are a mitigation measure designed to 
"significantly reduce and virtually eliminate human foot traffic across 
the dunes to the beach, thereby avoiding dune erosion and degrada-
tion of ABM habitat."387 As pointed out by the Sierra Club, however, 
the agency had no guarantee that residents would actually use the 
walkovers,388 and FWS did not dispute that "a risk is posed by humans 
trampling on the sand dunes which are part of the ABM critical 
habitat .... "389 This risk presented by the construction of walkovers 
and the resulting human traffic through ABM critical habitat is clearly 
adverse modification in violation of section 7(a)(2).390 Critical habitat 
is intended by Congress to be a sanctuary preserved for the survival 
and recovery of the species.391 Based on this, it seems that the con-
struction of dune walkovers to bring beachgoers into ABM critical 
383 See supra notes 378-81, which illustrate the scientific consensus on the role of the scrub 
dunes in the ABM habitat. 
384 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
385 See Defendants' Brief, supra note 102, at 19. 
386 See id. at 22. 
387 Paradise Joint Venture BO, supra note 124, at 20; Aronov BO, supra note 265, at 30. 
388 See Plaintiff's Brief II, supra note 33, at 18 n.6. 
389 Defendants' Brief, supra note 102, at 19. 
390 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
391 See id. § 1533(b )(2). 
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habitat is "not in accordance with law,"392 and the district court's 
suspension of the ITPs should be upheld on appeal. 
Finally, FWS's finding that the issuance of the ITPs would not 
jeopardize the continued existence of the ABM, as required by ESA 
section 7(a)(2), was not supported. To make this decision, FWS must 
have considered all the "important aspects" of the problem, and it 
must have offered an explanation for its grant of the ITPs that is 
consistent with the evidence that was before it. 393 
Based on the lack of basic biological information on the ABM-a 
problem known to FWS at the time of its decisions-it would be 
impossible for anyone to state with surety whether these two ITPs 
would put the ABM in jeopardy.394 As the fourth and seventh ITPs 
issued against the ABM, respectively,395 the Aronov and Paradise 
Joint Venture developments together will destroy at least 44.5 acres 
of occupied ABM habitat.396 This is a decade after the Recovery Plan 
clearly stated that it was unlikely that there was enough suitable 
ABM habitat to ever recover the species.397 In these circumstances, it 
is difficult to imagine how FWS can support a finding of no jeopardy. 
The agency appears to have acted in complete contradiction to evi-
dence before it in finding that the grant of these ITPs would not 
jeopardize the ABM.398 
4. The ITPs Violate Section 10(a) of the ESA 
FWS did not address the requirement of section lO(a) of the ESA 
that the HCPs must, "to the maximum extent practicable, minimize 
and mitigate the impacts of ... [the] taking."399 Congress and the 
agency have not defined "to the maximum extent practicable" within 
the context of the ESA.400 But the clear directive seems to prescribe 
an independent duty on the part of the agency to review the mitiga-
392 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a). 
393 See Motar Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43. 
394 See supra Section III.B.l and accompanying notes for a discussion of the lack of biological 
foundation in the ABM HCPs. 
395 See supra note 241 for the date each ABM ITP was issued. 
396 See Aronov BO, supra note 265, at 23; see also Paradise Joint Venture BO, supra note 124, 
at 17. The Aronov development will permanently destroy 7.5 acres of occupied ABM habitat, 
and the Paradise Joint Venture will destroy 37 acres. 
397 See supra Section II notes 117-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ABM 
Recovery Plan's dire prediction for the ABM and the FWS subsequent grants of eleven ITPs. 
398 See Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43. 
399 16 U .S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
400 See id. § 1532 (definition section of the ESA); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (definitions promulgated by 
DOl under ESA). 
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tion measures included in the HCP to ensure that they are the best 
possible means through which to avoid the effects of the taking on the 
species, and to compensate for those effects that cannot be avoided. 
FWS simply did not assert in the BOs for either development that 
the impacts of the takings were mitigated to such an extent. 401 
The mitigation strategies at the Paradise Joint Venture develop-
ment in particular seem to offset very little of the impact of the 
development on the ABM and its habitat.402 The mitigation fund of 
$150,000 provided by the developer is only enough to purchase six 
acres of additional ABM habitat, assuming such habitat is even avail-
able for sale.403 Even if it is available, six acres does not begin to 
compensate for the complete destruction of thirty-seven acres of habi-
tat, not to mention the habitat permanently altered. 404 The indirect 
effects of the development, anticipated to be predation by house cats, 
attraction of ABM competitors and predators to refuse containers, 
and disruption of the ABM's nocturnal behaviors by lighting, are 
minimized to a certain extent by the HCP's prohibition of pet cats, 
the requirement of scavenger-proof garbage cans, and limits on the 
amount and direction of lights in the development.405 But it is unlikely 
that these measures to minimize indirect effects will be able to 
sufficiently offset the egregious lack of compensation for lost ABM 
habitat to meet the high standard of mitigation and minimization "to 
the maximum extent practicable."406 As such, the HCPs appear to 
violate section lO(a) of the ESA, and FWS should not have issued 
ITPs to take the ABM based on them.407 
401 See generally Paradise Joint Venture BO, supra note 124; Aronov BO, supra note 265. 
402 See Paradise Joint Venture BO, supra note 124, at 18-20, for a discussion of the mitigation 
measures required and recommended by the FWS. 
403 See id. at 19. The BOs for both projects estimate the market value of scrub dune habitat 
at $25,000 per acre. But FWS also warns that the developments could cause area market values 
to increase, so that $150,000 would not be enough to purchase even six acres. See id. 
404 See id. at 18. 
405 See id. at 20. 
406 Beach Mouse HCP Case Proceeding in Alabama, ENDANGERED SPECIES AND WETLANDS 
REPORT, Nov. 1997, at 4. It has been reported that FWS broke off settlement negotiations 
between the plaintiff and the developers in the Sierra Club case, even after reaching an 
agreement under which Paradise Joint Venture and Aronov would supplement their mitigation 
funds by an additional $100,000. The Department of Justice attorney involved in settlement 
discussions was quoted as stating, ''We were concerned that there not be a surprise settlement 
requiring more funds, when we've adopted a No Surprises policy." If this is the case, it would 
appear that FWS places its policy of No Surprises above the section 10(a)(2)(B)(ii) requirement 
that mitigation be to the maximum extent practicable. [d. 
407 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
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In the case of the ABM, FWS has narrowly construed its own 
regulations under the ESA, as well as those promulgated by the CEQ 
to effectuate NEPA's requirements.408 This has enabled the agency to 
avoid issuance of an EIS even in the face of the significant cumulative 
impacts from previous and future ITPs, to avoid finding adverse 
modification of ABM critical habitat, to avoid a finding that the ABM's 
continued existence will be jeopardized by the developments, and to 
avoid substantive review of whether the mitigation strategies of the 
RCPs will actually help conserve the ABM.409 The FWS's crabbed 
construction of its statutory duties belies the agency's authority un-
der the ESA to enforce the statute's provisions.41o It also reflects a 
policy that runs counter to the conservation mandate woven through-
out the provisions of the ESA. The Eleventh Circuit should thus 
uphold the district court's remand of the ITPs back to FWS until the 
agency acquires more information on the present populations of ABM, 
and until it can obtain significantly better mitigation measures from 
the applicants. 
B. The ESA Mandates that HCPs Further Species Recovery Goals 
The legislative history of the 1982 amendment to the ESA adding 
section lO(a) clearly indicates that Congress intended FWS to review 
HCPs based on their ability to provide a net benefit to endangered or 
threatened species.411 The general purpose of the ESA, to conserve 
endangered and threatened species and the ecosystems on which they 
depend, provides further support for the implementation of such a 
"recovery standard."412 
The statutory language of section lO(a) itself, however, is not as 
clear. The requirement that the incidental take "not appreciably re-
duce the likelihood of survival and recovery" seems to militate against 
an absolute requirement that an RCP benefit the covered species.413 
408 See supra Section V.B.2 and accompanying notes for a discussion of FWS's failure to 
realistically address cumulative impacts under ESA and NEPA, Section V.B.3 and accompany-
ing notes for a discussion of FWS's narrow view of what constitutes adverse modification to 
critical habitat, and Section V.B.4 and accompanying notes for a discussion of FWS's failure to 
consider whether the HCPs at issue mitigated and minimized the effects of the takings to the 
maximum extent practicable. 
409 See supra Section V.B and accompanying notes for a discussion of issues surrounding 
FWS's implementation of the ESA section 10 ITP process. 
410 See 50 C.F.R. § 10.1 (providing FWS with power to administer and enforce the ESA). 
411 See supra Section UI.A and accompanying notes for a discussion of Congress' reliance on 
the San Bruno Mountain HCP as the model against which others should be measured. 
412 See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). 
413 [d. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv). 
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Although a policy of reviewing HCPs based solely on a "survival 
standard" is anathema to the ESA itself, FWS has made it clear that 
it does not require measures to recover species in HCPS.414 
An argument can be made that even under the deferential standard 
of review articulated in Chevron, FWS's reliance on a survival stand-
ard in its HCP review is not a reasonable interpretation of the stat-
ute.415 An FWS policy requiring use of a recovery standard, in which 
HCPs are reviewed based at least in part on their ability to provide 
a net benefit to endangered species, is a reasonable agency interpre-
tation of section 10(a) that could survive Chevron analysis.416 
1. HCP Recovery Mandate Could Survive Chevron 
The first step of the two-step process in the review of an agency's 
statutory construction is the determination of whether Congress has 
spoken directly on the issue.417 Under Chevron, the court must use 
the standard tools of statutory construction to determine congres-
sional intent.418 Looking to the explicit text of section 1O(a)(2)(B)(iv), 
if "not appreciably reduc[ing] the likelihood of species recovery" is a 
higher standard than "not appreciably reduc[ing] the likelihood of 
species survival," then the inclusion of "survival" in the provision 
could be seen as extraneous.419 It is clear based on this language that 
an incidental take of a species may not appreciably reduce either the 
likelihood of survival or recovery, so inclusion of the higher standard 
is sufficient. It is unclear why Congress included "survival" in the 
provision, and while not enough on its own to render the statute 
ambiguous under Chevron, it arguably contributes to a lack of clarity 
in the text.420 
It may also be possible to argue that any conflict between the 
overriding purpose of the ESA to conserve and recover species and 
use of the term "survival" in section lO(a) obfuscates congressional 
intent enough to render it ambiguous. One specific divergence from 
Chevron made by the Supreme Court in Sweet Home was the Court's 
reliance on the general purpose of the statute to ascertain congres-
414 See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 19, at 3-20. 
415 467 U.S. at 842-43. See supra Section IV.B.2 and accompanying notes for a discussion of 
the standard of review of administrative actions articulated in Chevron. 
416 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
417 See id. 
418 [d. 
419 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv). 
420 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
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sional intent.421 If the explicit and overriding conservation goal of the 
ESA becomes part of the inquiry into the congressional intent behind 
section 10, then the statute could be ambiguous based on the incon-
sistency between any ESA provision not obviously geared toward a 
recovery goal and the strong conservation mandate permeating the 
Act.422 
If congressional intent is declared to be unclear, then the argument 
proceeds to step two of Chevron analysis: is the agency's construc-
tion of the statute a permissible one?423 In making this determination, 
the court "may not substitute its own construction of a statutory 
provision for a reasonable interpretation by the administrator of an 
agency."424 
In Sweet Home, the Court's review of whether the Secretary prom-
ulgated a reasonable regulation was based in part on legislative his-
tory.425 The legislative history of section 10 constitutes the strongest 
and most persuasive evidence that RCP review was to be based at 
least in part on whether the permittee provided a benefit to the 
species covered by the plan.426 The San Bruno Mountain RCP was 
declared by Congress to be "the model" for the ITP, and the "ade-
quacy of other plans" was to be measured against the recovery meas-
ures of the San Bruno Mountain RCP.427 The legislative history of 
section 10 clearly supports FWS implementation of an RCP standard 
based on a plan's ability to recover endangered species.428 
In addition, the ESA's primary goal of recovering species to the 
point at which they no longer require the protection of the Act is in 
direct conflict with an interpretation that merely prevents their ex-
tinction.429 The FWS "survival standard" for RCP review is not ex-
plicitly supported by the text or legislative history of section 10, nor 
by the purposes of the Act.430 It is arguably not a permissible con-
struction requiring the traditionally high level of judicial deference.431 
421 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 698. 
422 See id. 
423 467 U.S. at 843. 
424 [d. at 844. 
425 515 U.S. at 704. 
426 H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at 31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2872. 
427 [d. 
428 See id. 
429 See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3). 
430 See id. § 1539; H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at 31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 
2872. 
431 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
1998] HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS 185 
2. Policy Reasons to Enforce a Recovery Standard 
There are also broad policy reasons for ensuring that HCPs are 
reviewed based on a recovery standard. First, were it not for the 
special exemption provided by Congress, any taking or adverse 
modification of the habitat of an endangered species would be unlaw-
fu1. 432 Equitable principles support the premise that those who profit 
from their receipt of a special exception to the law should be held 
responsible for ensuring that the overall goals of the law are not 
thwarted by the exception. This is especially true given that for every 
ITP issued, the goals of species recovery and eventual de-listing 
become at least proportionately more difficult to achieve. And, when 
FWS has to make up this conservation shortfall, it will invariably be 
at taxpayer expense. More authorized takes of species translate into 
a need for more government-funded conservation programs and more 
enforcement of the statute's provisions in other habitat areas, just to 
maintain the species' current tenuous position. The ITP is thus a 
public subsidy of development in dollars as well as in the public values 
associated with ensuring diversity in the ecosystems of the planet.433 
Second, in addition to the clear intrinsic and moral value in restor-
ing species to their former vitality, the effort to conserve species can 
be justified in terms of preserving their social utility.434 Assuming the 
veracity of the "indicator role" played by endangered species, fulfilled 
when those species warn of the impending impact of wasteful devel-
opment on the tangible human values of health, safety, and efficient 
resource management, the terms of the ESA should no doubt be 
construed with the ultimate goal of recovering those species.435 En-
dangered species are indicators of the harmful results of overdevelop-
ment, warning of both negative economic impacts and of the imminent 
destruction of complex ecosystems. 
For instance, the existence of the ABM on the Fort Morgan Pen-
insula is an indicator of the remaining development value of the re-
gion. This value could be defined in terms of the remaining natural 
beauty and resources of the region, for these are the factors that make 
the area attractive to potential homeowners. As ABM habitat is de-
432 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(B) (the prohibition against "taking" endangered species); see id. 
§ 1532(19) (definition of ''take'' under section 9 of the ESA includes "harm" to endangered 
species); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (definition of ''harm'' includes "significant habitat modification or 
degradation"). 
433 See Sher & Weiner, supra note 24, at 69. 
434 See Plater, supra note 39, at 853. 
435 See id. 
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vel oped and its populations decline, so too does the desirability of the 
Peninsula as a resort community, and property values eventually will 
be affected. If the ABM becomes extinct and its habitat is completely 
usurped, the region will have reached or exceeded its capacity for 
human development. At this point, the human values associated with 
living on the Peninsula will have been decimated along with the views. 
Recovery of the ABM will thus help ensure that the values associated 
with home ownership on the Fort Morgan Peninsula are preserved. 
This social indicator function provided by the ABM can only benefit 
society if the ABM is conserved and brought back from the brink of 
extinction.436 
The ABM is also an indicator of the overall vitality of the Fort 
Morgan Peninsula sand dune ecosystem. As the ABM population 
dwindles toward extinction, so too does the ecosystem that supports 
sea turtles, sea oats, beach grasses, and numerous other plant and 
animal species.437 These species also rely on the health of that ecosys-
tem for their survival. For instance, as development of the beachfront 
area of the Peninsula continues unabated, loggerhead and green sea 
turtles will likely have to find other areas less populated by humans 
for nesting.438 This is because even passive human interaction with 
nesting turtles can interfere with the turtles' ability to select appro-
priate nesting sites to lay their eggs.439 So the decline of the ABM and 
subsequent triggering of the ESA's legal protections send a signal 
that not only is the continued existence of the ABM at risk, but the 
ecosystem and its other indigenous species are similarly imperiled. 
CONCLUSION 
The ESA was enacted with the overriding goal of recovering en-
dangered and threatened species. The plight of the ABM, however, 
has provided an apt illustration of the problems of limiting review of 
RCPs under section 10 of the ESA to a mere "survival standard." At 
least thirteen permits have been issued to take the ABM in the last 
four years alone, and almost twenty percent of the original range of 
the species has been decimated by development. Even in the face of 
a persistent lack of data and an inadequate review of the cumulative 
436 See id. 
437 See ABM RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 105, at 3 (list of other plant species that populate 
the sand dune ecosystem). 
438 See Paradise Joint Venture BO, supra note 124, at 25. 
439 See id. 
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effects of such development, FWS has approved every application to 
take the ABM. This is after the agency admitted in 1985 that already 
there was not enough suitable habitat to recover the species. 
FWS maintains a consistently narrow view of its authority to lev-
erage HCPs as tools of recovery. By maintaining a survival standard 
in its review of HCPs, even as it aggressively promotes their use by 
private landowners, FWS has virtually ensured that the ESA will fail 
to achieve the goals Congress articulated for the statute. The ABM 
will pay the ultimate price for the ESA's unfulfilled mandate of species 
recovery. 
